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This article discusses regulation of franchising within the European Community and its effect
on competition policy. In part I the author gives a general presentation of the regulation, in part
II the author discusses the scope of the regulation, in Part III the author discusses the substantive
provisions of the regulation, and in the Conclusion the author suggests potential solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
For Europe, 1992 is slowly but surely becoming a year as
important as 1492 is for America: five hundred years after Co-
lumbus discovered America, Europe should be discovered by
the Europeans as constituting a single entity, a great unified
market. This is the current priority for Community action, the
aim towards which all Community policies are directed. Com-
petition policy is essential in this context, because competition
will allow the complete opening up of the markets, thus yield-
ing all the expected positive economic effects. Competition
policy must guarantee that the physical, technical, and tax bar-
riers that will disappear are not replaced by segmented mar-
kets resulting from restrictive business practices. It must also
foster market integration in a positive way, by encouraging co-
operation among undertakings capable of improving produc-
tion or distribution and by promoting technical or economic
progress.
Distribution is an area of major importance for market in-
tegration. Exclusive distribution agreements, for instance, en-
able manufacturers to enter new geographical markets because
of the experience of exclusive importers that are already estab-
lished in those markets. They also facilitate the promotion .of
sales of their products while at the same time rationalizing dis-
tribution.
Franchising, another form of distribution, helps to inte-
grate the Common Market by making it easier for relatively
small firms to develop cross-frontier distribution networks.
The Community takes a generally positive view towards
franchise agreements, because they allow franchisors to estab-
lish their networks with only limited investments, which may
243
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assist the entry of new competitors in the market and, there-
fore, increase interbrand competition. They also allow in-
dependent traders to set up outlets more rapidly and with a
higher chance of success than if they had to do so indepen-
dently. Finally, they are favorable for consumers, because they
combine the advantages of a uniform distribution network with
the existence of traders that are personally involved in the effi-
cient operation of their businesses. The favorable effect of
franchising on interbrand competition will normally guarantee
that a reasonable part of the resulting benefits will be passed
on to the consumers.
Although the Commission's first decision concerning
franchising was adopted in December 1986, the interest of the
Commission in that form of agreement is not new. More than
ten years ago, the Commission started to study, from the point
of view of competition law, the different aspects of franchising
as a new means of cooperation between enterprises in the
Community. In 1978, it took part in the drawing up by the
European Franchising Association of a European code of eth-
ics for franchising.I In 1983, a seminar was organized jointly
by the EEC Commission and the French authorities to examine
the problems of franchising in relation to competition law.2
Several commentators' suggested that franchise agree-
ments either did not fall under Article 85 or could benefit from
the provisions of the block exemption regulation for exclusive
dealing agreements.4 However, the treatment of franchise
agreements under EEC competition rules remained unclear.
In January 1986, the Court ofJustice, in the Pronuptia case,
1. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN CODE OF ETHICS FOR
FRANCHISING (1981).
2. See Schlieder, Le Franchisage et le Droit de la Concurrence, REVUE DE LA CONCUR-
RENCE ET DE LA CONSOMMATION 43 (Supp. to No. 25, 1984).
3. See, e.g., Adams, Franchising and Antitrust in the United Kingdom and European Com-
munity, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 815 (1981); Goebel, The Uneasy Fate of Franchising Under
EEC Antitrust Laws, 10 EUR. L. REV. 87 (1985); Neumann, Franchise-Vertrdge und EG-
Kartellrecht, 31 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAF-r 612 (1985).
4. Comm'n Regulation No. 67/67, 10J.O. L 67/849 (1967), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1967, at 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2727 [hereinafter Regulation 67/67] (on
exclusive dealing agreements), replaced by Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, OJ. L
173/1 (1983), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730 [hereinafter Regulation 1983/83]
(on exclusive distribution agreements), and Comm'n Regulation No. 1984/83, O.J. L
173/5 (1983), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733 [hereinafter Regulation 1984/83]
(on exclusive purchasing agreements).
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adopted its first position about franchising.5 There, the Court
considered that a distribution franchise agreement does not, in
itself, interfere with competition.6 It considered, in particular,
that a non-competition obligation on the franchisees did not
fall under Article 85(1), because it was indispensable for the
proper functioning of a franchising system.
The Pronuptia judgment has been welcomed by many com-
mentators as "finally" establishing the principle that vertical
restrictions should be submitted to a rule-of-reason approach
under Article 85(1). 7 Should this judgment, therefore, be
hailed as the "European Sylvania"?' It is indeed a milestone
for the application of Community competition rules to vertical
restrictions; however, for the following reasons its scope
should not be unduly widened.
First, Pronuptia does not involve a rule-of-reason analysis,
as the Court of Justice did not refer to any market-power con-
siderations. 9 Rather, it only considered that provisions that
are essential for avoiding the possibility of the franchisor's
know-how and assistance from benefiting its competitors do
not constitute restrictions of competition for the purposes of
5. Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
14,245.
6. Id. at 381, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,438.
7. See, e.g., Galan Corona, Los Contratos de "Franchising" ante el Derecho Comunitario
Protector de la Libre Competencia, 13 REVISTA DE INSTITUCIONES EUROPEAS 687, 692
(1986); Goebel, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis,
23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 683 (1986) (case comment); Korah, Pronuptia Franchising:
The Marriage of Reason and the EEC Competition Rules, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99
(1986); Venit, Pronuptia: Ancillary Restraints-or Unholy Alliances, 11 EUROPEAN L. REv.
213 (1986); see also Waelbroeck, The Pronuptia Judgment-a Critical Appraisal, in 1986
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 211, 211 (B. Hawk ed. 1987) ("[T]he approach [the Court]
adopted was largely based on the rule of reason, Unfortunately, however, the Court
failed to carry its reasoning to its logical conclusion."). But see 2 B. Hawk, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 426.3 (2d ed. 1987) ("anal-
ysis should not be confused with a U.S. rule of reason analysis").
8. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36 (1977), established a rule-of-reason approach for non-price vertical restric-
tions, thereby reversing United States v. Schwinn, 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which had
established that territorial, customer, and price restrictions imposed on dealers were
per se infringements of the antitrust rules. Id. at 375-76; see 2 B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 306 (2d ed. 1987).
9. Advocate General P. VerLoren van Themaat referred to Sylvania in his con-
clusions in the Pronuptia case to consider that the Court's assessment should be based
on an examination of the market situation and in particular of interbrand competi-
tion. Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 361, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,446-
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Article 85(l). l" The same consideration was made for the
measures that were necessary for maintaining the common
identity and reputation of the franchised network."
Second, Pronuptia does not constitute the major shift in
Community case law that Sylvania did in the United States, be-
cause it applies the notion of ancillary restraints, which was al-
ready known and applied in Community law, in particular, for
the sale of a business,' 2 selective distribution,' 3 and licenses of
industrial property rights."
Finally, care should be taken in extending the principles
expressed in the Pronuptia judgment to other distribution
agreements, because the Court of Justice stressed the impor-
tance of industrial property rights involved in franchising.' 5
The significance of the Pronuptia judgment lies in the fact
that it applies the notion of ancillary restraint in a more exten-
sive way than had been done before, 16 by combining principles
developed in the fields of distribution and licenses of industrial
property rights. In addition, it confirms the strict position
taken from the start by the Commission and the Court of Jus-
10. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
85(1), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) at 32 (official English version), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (1958) (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
11. Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 381-82, T 16-17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,438-39.
12. The Court considers that a non-competition clause in an agreement for the
sale of a business does not fall under Article 85(1) if it is necessary to the transfer of
the enterprise concerned and its duration and scope are strictly limited to that pur-
pose. Remia v. Commission, Case 42/84, 1985 E.C.R. 2545, 2571, 20, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,217, at 16,301.
13. See, e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435; Villeroy & Boch, O.J. L 367/17 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,758.
14. About the admissible territorial protection of the licensee, see Erauw Jac-
query v. La Hesbignonne, Case 27/87, 1988 E.C.R. - (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases
file); Coditel v. Cin6-Vog Films (Coditel II), Case 262/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3381, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8865; Nungesser v. Commission (Maize seed), Case 258/78,
1982 E.C.R. 2015, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8805,
15. See Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 381-82, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,438-39.
16. See Green, Article 85 in Perspective: Stretching Jurisdiction, Narrowing the Concept of
a Restriction and Plugging a Few Gaps, 9 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 190 (1988). Green
notes that the test used in Remia was stricter than in Pronuptia, because in the former
case the Court examined whether the agreement as a whole was pro-competitive,
whereas in the latter it was considered sufficient to observe that the agreement did
not interfere with competition. In other words, it did not have either positive or
negative effects on competition. Id. at 196-97.
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tice towards certain basic principles of Community competi-
tion law, such as market partitioning and resale price mainte-
nance. The consequence is that franchise agreements that
appreciably affect intra-community trade are considered re-
strictive if they include, in particular, territorial protection for
the franchisees. 17
The Court of Justice found, furthermore, that franchise
agreements falling under the prohibition of the Community
competition rules could not benefit from any existing block ex-
emption regulations.' 8 In view of the considerable develop-
ment of franchise agreements in the Community, where they
now represent approximately ten percent of all retail sales,' 9
the Commission considered it necessary to give priority to the
examination of notified cases concerning franchising in order
to acquire the necessary experience for the preparation of a
block exemption regulation for franchise agreements. 20  A
draft version of this regulation (the "Draft Regulation") was
published in August 1987 in order to obtain the observations
of interested parties. 2' More than forty responses were re-
ceived by the Commission. After the required consultations of
the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopo-
lies, consisting of Member State experts, Commission Regula-
tion No. 4087/88 (the "Regulation" or the "Franchising Regu-
lation") 22 was adopted by the Commission on November 30,
17. Except if the agreements are de minimis. See in that respect the Commis-
sion's Notice of 3 September 1986 on Agreements of Minor Importance, OJ. C
231/2 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2700 [hereinafter De Minimis Notice],
which specifies that agreements are normally considered as not falling under Article
85(1) if the market share of the participating enterprises is not superior to five per-
cent and their aggregate turnover (worldwide) does not exceed 200 million ECU. Id.
at 2-3, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2700, at 1853-3. The notice specifies that it
does not apply where in a relevant market competition is restricted by the cumulative
effect of parallel networks of similar agreements. Id. at 4, 16, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2700, at 1854.
18. Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 386-87, 32, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245,
at 16,441.
19. See Sutherland, Franchise Agreements Under EEC Competition Rules, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,776, at 11,806 (address to Euro Conferences, Brussels, Mar.
25, 1986).
20. Id. at 11,808.
21. Draft Commission Regulation (EEC) on the Application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty to Catagories of Franchise Agreements, O.J. C 229/3 (1987) [hereinafter
Draft Regulation].
22. Comm'n Regulation No. 4087/88, On the Application of Article 85(3) of the
1989] 247
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1988.
I. GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE REGULATION
The object of the Regulation is not to cover all aspects of
franchising but only to specify which restrictions included in
franchise agreements are compatible with EEC competition
rules. The Regulation does not intend to give a general defini-
tion of "franchise agreement," but delimits a category of
agreements that fall under Article 85(1) and normally fulfill the
conditions for an exemption set out in Article 85(3).23 First, it
should be remembered that not all franchise agreements fall
under Article 85(1); they only do so if they appreciably restrict
competition within the Common Market and affect trade be-
tween Member States.24 Second, agreements falling under
85(1) and not covered by the Franchising Regulation may still
benefit from an individual exemption. 5
A. Legal Basis
According to Article 87 of the Treaty, the Council is the
competent authority to adopt regulations implementing the
principles of Articles 85 and 86. Under the authority of this
Article, the Council adopted Regulation 19/65,26 which em-
powers the Commission to apply Article 85(3) to certain cate-
gories of exclusive agreements between two undertakings that
fall within the scope of 85(1), when the agreement either has as
its object the exclusive distribution or purchase of goods or
includes restrictions imposed in relation to the assignment or
use of industrial property rights.
Following the judgment of the Court in Pronuptia, the
Commission believed that it was possible to define a category
of agreements that could be deemed generally to meet the.
Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements, O.J. L 359/46 (1988) [hereinafter
Franchising Regulation], reprinted in the appendix to this Article, infra pp. 297-310.
23. Id. recital 4, at 46, reprinted infra p. 298.
24. See EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 85(1), Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32, 298
U.N.T.S. at 47-48; see Skaupy, Pronuptia und die Folgen, 36 WIRTSCHAFr UND
WET-rBEWERB [WuW] 445, 453 (1986).
25. See EEC Treaty, supra note 10, art. 85(3), Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-33, 298
U.N.T.S. at 48.
26. Council Regulation No. 19/65, 8J.O. 533 (1965), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-
66, at 35, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2717 [hereinafter Regulation 19/65].
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conditions set up in Article 85(3) and, thus, benefit from an
exemption from Article 85(1). The Commission considered
that, essentially, such agreements could be defined as agree-
ments on the exploitation of industrial or intellectual property
rights, such as trademarks, trade names, and know-how, for the
purpose of selling goods or providing services in premises of
uniform appearance and with the same business methods.
Franchise agreements, therefore, correspond to the second
category of agreements envisaged by Regulation 19/65.7
Where franchise agreements also include restrictions relating
to the purchase or supply of certain goods, they also fall under
the first category.28 The question has been raised whether the
arguments given by the Court of Justice in the Pronuptia case
for rejecting the application of Regulation 67/6729 to franchise
agreements30 should not apply equally to the competence of
the Commission to adopt a block exemption regulation for
franchise agreements on the basis of Regulation 19/65.31
However, the four arguments given by the Court of Justice to
refuse the application of Regulation 67/67 are based on the
fact that this regulation refers only to exclusive distributor-
ships,32 while Regulation 19/65 also refers to restrictions im-
27. See id. art. 1(1)(b), at 543, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-66, at 36, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2718, at 1872.
28. See id. art. 1(1)(a), at 543, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-66, at 36, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2718, at 1872.
29. See supra note 4.
30. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 387, 33-34, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,441.
31. See, Korah, Franchising and the Draft Group Exemption, 8 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 124, 127 (1987); see also Mendelsohn, Consideration for a Block Exemption Regula-
tion, J. INT'L FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L., Sept. 1986, at 9. Mendelsohn was of
the opinion that the Commission did not have the power to adopt a block exemption
under Regulation 19/65 for service franchise agreements. Id.
32. See Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 387, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245,
at 16,441. The four arguments are as follows: (i) contracts benefiting from the ex-
emption are defined by reference to exclusive supply and/or purchase and not by the
characteristics of distribution franchising contracts, which include use of the same
sign, the application of uniform commercial methods, and the payment of royalties;
(ii) article 2 expressly applies to only agreements regarding exclusive dealing agree-
ments, which are different in nature from distribution franchising contracts; (iii) the
same article lists only restrictions and obligations that can be imposed on the distrib-
utor, without mentioning those that can be imposed on the other party to the con-
tract, while in the case of distribution franchising the obligations assumed by the
franchisor have a very special importance; and (iv) in article 2(2), the list of obliga-
tions that may be imposed on an exclusive distributor does not include the obligation
1989] 249
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posed in relation to the assignment or use of industrial prop-
erty rights. 3
Regulation 19/65 provides that the Commission may
adopt a block exemption regulation only when it has sufficient
knowledge of the kinds of agreements in question. 4 Before
drafting the Franchising Regulation, the Commission, there-
fore, gained experience in the field of franchising by examin-
ing a large number of contracts and adopting five decisions
concerning franchising systems: Pronuptia,3 5 Yves Rocher,3 6
Computerland,37 ServiceMaster,38  and Charles Jourdan.39  The
amount of experience necessary before the Commission
adopts a block exemption regulation based on Regulation
19/65 has varied; before the adoption of Regulation 67/67,
several decisions concerning exclusive distribution had been
to pay royalties or the obligations that are needed to preserve the identity and repu-
tation of the network. Id.
It should be stressed that these arguments seem to be far from convincing, as
article 2 of Regulation No. 67/67 specifically considers as non-restrictive obligations
such as selling the contract goods under trademarks or packed and presented under
the manufacturer's specifications, providing after-sale and guaranteed services, or
employing staff having specialized or technical training. Regulation 67/67, supra
note 4, art. 2(2), at 851, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1967, at 10, 11-12, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2727, at 1883. The same provisions exist in Regulation 1983/83, supra note
4, art. 2, at 2-3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1893. Furthermore, according
to the Court of Justice, the obligations that would not be covered by Regulation
67/67 are considered by the same Court not to fall under Article 85(1). This point
has been made by most commentators of the Pronuptia judgment. See, e.g., Demaret,
L Arret Pronuptia et les Contrats de Franchise en Droit Europien de la Concurrence: Innovation
et Tradition, 48 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 729, 737-38 (1986); Korah, supra note 7;
Skaupy, supra note 24, at 445; Venit, supra note 7; Waelbroeck, supra note 7. But see
Clement & Boutard-Labarde, La Franchise et le Droit Europien de la Concurrence, GAZETrE
DU PALAiS, Apr. 6-8, 1986, at 11, 11-12 (finding the arguments of the Court ofJustice
satisfactory).
33. The Franchising Regulation refers to industrial or intellectual property
rights to take into account the different terminology used in the various Member
States. The concept of intellectual property rights is understood in most Member
States as a wide notion including, in particular, trademarks, patents, know-how,
signs, and copyrights; but in Spain and Portugal it does not include trademarks and
patents.
34. Regulation 19/65, supra note 26, fourth whereas clause, at 533, O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1965-66, at 35, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2717, at 1871.
35. Pronuptia, O.J. L 13/39 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,854 (exam-
ining different agreements than those examined by the Court of Justice).
36. Yves Rocher, OJ. L 8/49 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855.
37. Computerland, OJ. L 222/12 (1987), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,906.
38. ServiceMaster, O.J. L 332/38 (1988), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11,047.
39. Charles Jourdan, O.J. L 35/31 (1989).
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made,4 ° while only one decision 4' preceded Regulation
123/85.42
Regulation 19/65 involves another limitation, as it speci-
fies that block exemptions adopted on its basis can only cover
agreements between two undertakings. 43 However, agree-
ments between several companies, in the case of a master
franchise in particular, can be covered if they can be analyzed
as a bundle of bilateral sets of obligations.
B. The Structure of the Regulation
Article 1 of the Franchising Regulation includes the prin-
ciple of the exemption and a set of definitions of terms that are
used in the Regulation.44 Article 2 states which restrictions are
exempted. 45 Article 3 lists some obligations, normally not re-
strictive of competition, that may be included in an agreement,
insofar as they are necessary to protect the franchisor's indus-
trial or intellectual property rights; it also lists other obliga-
tions, normally not restrictive of competition, without qualifi-
cation and specifies that should these obligations become re-
strictive of competition because of specific circumstances, they
will also be covered by the exemption.4 6 Article 4 stipulates
which conditions must be fulfilled for the exemption to ap-
ply.47 Article 5 is the "black list" of restrictions that prevent
the application of the exemption.48
Article 6 provides for an "opposition procedure" pursu-
ant to which the exemption may be extended to agreements
that include obligations that are restrictive of competition and
are not expressly allowed or excluded by the Regulation. The
40. See, e.g., Junghans, O.J. L 30/10 (1977), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9912;
Goodyear Italiana-Euram, Oj. L 38/10 (1975), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9708.
41. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, O.J. L 29/1 (1975), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 9701 [hereinafter Bayerische Motoren Werke].
42. Comm'n Regulation No. 123/85, on Motor Vehicle Distribution and Serv-
icing Agreements, Oj. L 15/16 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751 [hereinaf-
ter Regulation 123/85].
43. Regulation 19/65, supra note 26, art. 1(1), it 534, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-
66, at 36, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2717, at 1872.
44. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1, at 48-49, reprinted infra pp. 302-
03.
45. Id. art. 2, at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
46. Id. art. 3, at 49-50, reprinted infra pp. 304-06.
47. Id. art. 4, at 50, reprinted infra pp. 306-07.
48. Id. art. 5, at 50, reprinted infra pp. 307-08.
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Commission must be notified of these agreements and express
reference must be made to the opposition procedure con-
cerned. If the Commission does not oppose such exemption
within a period of six months, then the exemption is ex-
tended.49  The presence of an opposition procedure gives
more flexibility for the application of the Regulation.50 It gives
the Commission the possibility of examining whether certain
obligations or combinations of obligations that may have been
unknown to it when drafting the Regulation can nevertheless
benefit from the block exemption. In addition, it gives compa-
nies legal security by allowing them to know within a short pe-
riod of time whether or not their agreements are susceptible to
problems being raised in relation to the Community competi-
tion rules.5 Article 7 guarantees that information provided in
notifications can be used only for the purposes of the Regula-
tion,5 2 in other words, for the application of Community com-
petition rules to franchise agreements. This article, which ex-
ists in all block exemption regulations incorporating an oppo-
sition procedure, repeats the provisions on professional
secrecy that appear in article 20 of Regulation 17.53 This pro-
vision is necessary, because the legal basis for a notification
referring to an opposition procedure is to be found in the rele-
vant article of the block exemption regulation involved, here
article 6, and not in Regulation 17.
49. Id. art. 6, at 50-51, reprinted infra pp. 308-09.
50. See P. Sutherland, Franchising: The European Community Context 12 (ad-
dress to the Twenty-Seventh Annual Convention of the International Franchisie Asso-
ciation, Jan. 27, 1987) (available at the Fordham International Law Journal office); see also
Comm'n, Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy 73 (1984). It should be noted
that all block exemption regulations adopted since 1984 include an opposition proce-
dure; with the only exception being Regulation 123/85, supra note 42.
51. For arguments in favor of the opposition procedure, see Vogelaar, The Over-
all Policy of the Commission Concerning Distribution in the Light of Recent Developments: Some
Capita Selecta, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 185, 192 (B. Hawk ed. 1987). Voge-
laar deplores the lack of an opposition procedure in Regulations 1983/83 and
1984/83. On the effects of the opposition procedure, see, in particular, Siragusa,
Notifications of Agreements in the EEC-to Notify or not to Notify, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 243, 263 (B. Hawk ed. 1987); Venit, The Commission's Opposition Procedure-
Between the Scylla of Ultra Vires and the Charybidis of Perfume: Legal Consequences and Tactical
Considerations, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 167 (1985).
52. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 7, at 51, reprinted infra p. 309.
53. Commission Regulation 17 is the first regulation implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty. See Comm'n Regulation No. 17, art. 20, 5J.O. 204, 211 (1962),
O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87, 93, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2591, at 1794-
95.
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Article 8, in conformity with article 7 of Regulation
19/65,54 recalls that the Commission may withdraw the benefit
of the block exemption if it considers that an agreement cov-
ered by the Regulation nevertheless has certain effects incom-
patible with the conditions laid down in Article 85(3). It also
provides a non-exhaustive list containing examples of situa-
tions that, on the basis of the Commission's experience, might
lead to a withdrawal of the exemption.5 5 The Commission
makes an individual decision as to whether or not the exemp-
tion is withdrawn, by following proceedings under Regulation
17 and after giving the parties concerned an opportunity to
make their views known. Such a decision cannot have a retro-
active effect. It may be coupled with an individual exemption
subject to conditions or obligations or subject to the finding of
an infringement and an order to bring it to an end. The Com-
mission has never adopted such a decision until now.56
Article 9 provides that the Regulation shall enter into
force on February 1, 1989, and remain in force until December
31, 1999. 57 The obligation to fix a limit for the application of
the block exemption is established in article 2(1) of Regulation
19/65.58 It makes it possible for the Commission to revise the
Regulation, if necessary, in light of the experience gained dur-
ing its application. The duration of the block exemption is not
intended to have an influence on the duration of the agree-
ments involved, as block exemption regulations are normally
renewed without or with only limited modifications.59
54. See Regulation 19/65, supra note 26, art. 7, at 535, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-
66, at 37, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2717, at 1874.
55. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 8, at 51, reprinted infra pp. 309-
10.
56. However, companies have in certain cases modified their agreements to
avoid a withdrawal of the exemption. See Tetra Pak I, OJ. L 272/27, at 41-42, 53
(1988), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11,015, at 12,431-16, where the Commission
indicated that it intended to withdraw the benefit of the exemption given to an exclu-
sive patent license by Regulation 2349/84 on Patent Licensing, O.J. L 219/15 (1984),
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747 [hereinafter Regulation 2349/84]. The license
did not include any restriction not covered by the Regulation, but the acquisition of
the license was considered to constitute an abuse of a dominant position because of
the structure of the market. The Commission did not need to withdraw formally the
exemption, because the license was transformed into a non-exclusive license.
57. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 9, at 51, reprinted infra p. 310.
58. Regulation 19/65, supra note 26, art. 2(1), at 534, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1965-
66, at 36, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2717, at 1872.
59. See Clough, Franchising in Europe Since the Pronuptia Case, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
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II. SCOPE OF THE REGULATION
A. The Notion of Franchise Agreement
The notion of franchise agreement varies considerably in
Europe from one country to another. In none of the Member
States of the European Community is there a legally binding
definition of "franchise agreement," as no specific national
legislation relating to franchising has been adopted until now.
The only tentative definition can be found in codes of ethics
adopted by franchisor associations,60 non-compulsory stan-
dards, 61 or in the case law of national courts62 or the Court of
Justice of the European Communities.6 3 Although all these
definitions are different, the existence of certain common prin-
ciples makes it possible to define a "European" notion of
franchising. It can be defined briefly as a method of coopera-
tion between independent companies based on the use of a
common name and the exploitation of specific knowledge.
This concept is, therefore, narrower than the general no-
tion of franchising in the United States, which includes, for ex-
ample, automobile dealerships.' Under Community law, such
REV. 317, 318 (1987); see, e.g., Comm'n Regulation No. 2779/72, 15 J.O. L 292/23
(1972), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1972 (28-30 Dec.), at 80, exempting specialization agree-
ments, initially applicable until 1977, extended by Comm'n Regulation Nos. 2903/77,
OJ. L 338/14 (1977) and 3604/82, OJ. L 376/33 (1982), replaced by Comm'n Regula-
tion No. 417/85, O.J. L 53/1 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2743, which is
applicable until December 31, 1997.
60. See, in particular, the definition adopted by the European Franchising Fed-
eration ("EFF") in 1980, quoted by Dubois, Franchising Under EEC Competition Law:
Implications of the Pronuptia Judgment and the Proposed Block Exemption, in 1986 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 115, 116 (B. Hawk ed. 1987). It should be noted that most of the
national franchising associations comprising the EFF have adopted their own defini-
tions.
61. See, e.g., L'AssOCIATION FRAN§AISE DE NORMALISATION, NORME FRAN§AISE:
FRANCHISE, RELATIONS CONTRACTUELLES (1987) (norms laying down minimum rules
relating to negotiation and contents of franchise agreements).
62. See, e.g., the definition given in Germany by the Bundesarbeitsgericht in its
judgment of May 30, 1978, ARBEITSRECHTLICHE PRAXIS [AP] No. 9, § 60 HGB, at
265-66, quoted in Schaub, Franchising und EG-Kartellrecht, 37 WuW 607, 607 (1987).
63. See the definition of distribution franchise in Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986
E.C.R. 353, 381, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,438.
64. For a comparison of the European and U.S. concepts of franchising, see Du-
bois, supra note 60, at 117-18. Dubois makes a distinction between the first genera-
tion of franchising, including for instance truck dealers and gas service station, and
the second generation concerning business format franchising. He considers, in
agreement with Duncan Whitfield, President of the EFF, that the European notion of
franchising "emphasises the existence of a partnership between the franchisor and
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agreements would be considered as selective distribution while
franchising would be limited to the U.S. notion of business for-
mat franchising.65
The Regulation is not intended to give a general definition
of all possible kinds of franchise agreements, instead it at-
tempts to determine a-category that is sufficiently homogene-
ous to make it possible to assume that agreements correspond-
ing to that definition, and fulfilling the other conditions set out
in the Regulation, will normally meet the conditions of applica-
tion of Article 85(3).
The Regulation defines "franchise" as a "package of in-
dustrial or intellectual property rights relating to trade marks,
trade names, shop signs, utility models, designs, copyrights,
know-how or patents, to be exploited for the resale of goods or
the provision of services to end users."' 6 6 It specifies that to be
covered by the Regulation, a franchise agreement shall in-
clude, at least, the following obligations: (i) "the use of a com-
mon name or shop sign and a uniform presentation of contract
premises and/or means of transport"; 67 (ii) "the communica-
tion by the franchisor to the franchisee of know-how";6 8 and
(iii) "the continuing provision by the franchisor to the fran-
chisee of commercial or technical assistance during the life of
the agreement."'69 It is important to stress that all three ele-
ments must be present; the exemption would not apply, for
example, in the case of a franchise based only on the use of a
common name, without communication of know-how.70
each of the franchisees," while the U.S. definition "insists on the franchisor's obliga-
tion to be the boss in the shop." Id.
65. For a discussion of U.S. business format franchising, see Strasser, Big Macs
and Radio Shacks: Antitrust Policy for Business Format Franchise, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 341
(1985). According to Konigsberg, A Compendium of Franchising Terms, J. INT'L
FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L., Dec. 1987, at 58, the U.S. Department of Com-
merce has defined business format franchising as being " 'characterized by an ongo-
ing business relationship between Franchisor and Franchisee that includes not only
the product, service and trade mark, but the entire business format itself-a market-
ing strategy and plan, operating manuals and standards, quality control, and contin-
ued two-way communic[a]tions.'" Id. at 60.
66. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. l(3)(a), at 48, reprinted infra p.
302.
67. Id.'art. l(3)(b), at 48, reprinted infra p. 302.
68. Id.
69. d.
70. Korah considers that "[t]here seems to be no reason why the exemption
should not apply where the value of the franchise may be the reputation of the net-
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The Regulation further defines "know-how" as a body of
"non-patented practical information, resulting from experi-
ence and testing by the franchisor, which is secret, substantial
and identified."'7 This definition is almost identical to the one
adopted in the block exemption for know-how licensing agree-
ments (the "Know-How Regulation"). 72 In the same way as
the Know-How Regulation, the Franchising Regulation defines
successively the concepts of secret, substantial, and identified.
"Secret" is taken in the broad sense, so that the way in which
the different elements constituting the know-how are com-
bined must not be "generally known or easily accessible. '7 3
Each element does not have to be secret or original.
The substantiality of the know-how is also defined in a rel-
ative way: it must be assessed by reference to its usefulness for
the franchisee, that is to say, it should be "capable, at the date
of conclusion of the agreement, of improving the competitive
position of the franchisee .... .. With respect to the previous
situation of the franchisee, the know-how must either help it
enter a new market or, if it is already present in that market,
improve its performance. 75 The know-how must be of impor-
tance for selling goods or for providing services to end-users.
It should relate, in particular, to "the presentation of goods for
sale, the processing of goods in connection [with] the provi-
sion of services, methods of dealing with customers, and ad-
ministration and financial management." 76 The know-how in-
work, rather than substantial know-how." Korah, supra note 31, at 129. This view is
not reconcilable with the Pronuptia judgment, which reasons that the basis for the
difference of treatment between selective distribution agreements and franchise
agreements is the importance of the know-how involved for the latter and the neces-
sity to protect it. Korah notes that where "the know-how is of little value, territorial
protection from others in the network is unlikely to be important." Id. Agreements
that do not include such protection shall normally not fall under Article 85(1) and
have, therefore, no need for an exemption. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying
text on the question of differentiation between distribution and franchise agree-
ments.
71. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(3) (f), at 48, reprinted infra p. 303.
72. Comm'n Regulation No. 556/89, O.J. L 66/1 (1989) [hereinafter Know-
How Regulation] (on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain catego-
ries of know-how licensing agreements).
73. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. l(3)(g), at 48, reprinted infra p.
303.




volved is not necessarily only commercial but may also be tech-
nical, especially in the case of service franchising." The
definition of the purposes of the know-how is one of the crite-
ria that helps to determine whether an agreement is covered
either by the Franchising Regulation or the Know-How Regu-
lation. Recital 5 of the Franchising Regulation refers more
specifically to the processing or adaptation of goods to fit the
specific needs of customers. This does not cover industrial
fabrication but covers, for example, such opeiations as key re-
production or assembly of prefabricated elements to form a
door or window of a determined size.
Finally, the know-how must be recorded in an appropriate
form. 78 For franchise agreements, this record usually takes the
form of a "bible," which describes in detail all the necessary
information for the functioning of the franchised outlets. It
may also be recorded in any kind of computer storage of data
base. This condition is set up to make it possible to check, a
posteriori, the secrecy and substantiality of the know-how in case
of contestation. 79 The Regulation does not specify the condi-
tions of disclosure of the know-how, as it is not considered to
be a problem of competition law.80
The Regulation also gives a specific definition of the
"franchisor's goods," which include only the goods manufac-
tured "by the franchisor or according to its instructions,
and/or bearing the franchisor's name or trade mark."'" This
category is intended to cover either goods manufactured by
the franchisor or its subcontractors, or third parties to which it
has granted a manufacturing license; these goods do not have
to carry the franchisor's brand, which may be technically im-
77. In Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 381, 15, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,245, at 16,438, the Court ofJustice only refers to business methods, but
only with respect to distribution franchises.
78. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1 (3)(i), at 49, reprinted infra p. 303.
79. Id.
80. A disclosure obligation is usually contained in the code of ethics adopted by
franchising associations; see, for example, article 4 of the code of ethics of the British
Franchise Association, which provides that "[full and accurate written disclosure of
all information material to the franchise relationship shall be given to the prospective
franchisees within a reasonable time prior to the execution of any binding docu-
ment." BFA Code of Ethics, reprinted in M. MENDELSOHN, THE ETHICS OF FRANCHIS-
ING: A BRITISH FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION GUIDE 37 app. (1987).
81. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(3)(d), at 48, reprinted infra p.
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possible for certain products. It also covers products manufac-
tured by third parties and selected by the franchisor, which af-
fixes its name on them (distribution trademark). The feature
common to these products is that the franchisor has an exclu-
sive right to market them and, therefore, may identify the
franchised network with these products. The distinction be-
tween the franchisor's products, as defined above, and other
products is used in the Regulation to determine which
purchasing restrictions may be imposed on the franchisees.82
The definition of "contract premises" makes a distinction
between fixed and mobile franchises.83 For the second cate-
gory, the services are not provided at the franchisee's prem-
ises; they may be provided at the customer's premises (e.g., for
cleaning services) or in any other place (e.g., for car repair
services). In that case, a distinction is made between two con-
cepts: the contract premises and the contract means of trans-
port. The contract premises is the base from which the fran-
chisee operates, i.e., where he keeps his stock and materials,
where his customers can contact him, and where his accounts
can be checked. The contract means of transport, on the other
hand, refers to the van or truck that the franchisee uses to pro-
vide the services and to which the franchisor's standards con-
cerning appearance and equipment are applied.
The Franchising Regulation, therefore, only concerns
agreements in which the franchisor grants the franchisee the
right to use certain signs and know-how and undertakes to pro-
vide continuing assistance to the franchisee during the life of
the agreement. 84 According to the Court ofJustice, these pro-
visions do not by themselves restrict competition 85 and, there-
fore, do not need an exemption. The Franchising Regulation
applies to agreements that combine these provisions with re-
strictions on competition, such as territorial protection or ex-
clusive dealing.86
The Regulation applies only to franchise agreements that
82. See infra notes 157-82 and accompanying text.
83. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. l(3)(e), at 48, reprinted infra p.
303.
84. Id. art. 1(3)(b), at 48, reprinted infra p. 302.
85. Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 381, 15, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,245, at 16,438.
86. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, recital 9, at 47, reprinted infra p. 299.
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include conditions to ensure that consumers receive a fair
share of the benefits resulting from the exempted agreements.
It provides that franchisees are obligated to indicate that they
are independent enterprises, so that consumers know that they
are not dealing with a branch of a large company. This indica-
tion can be made by any appropriate means that 'does not jeop-
ardize the -common identity of the network, for example, a
mention in the business papers or a card in the shop-window. 8 7
Where franchisees must honor a guarantee for the franchisor's
products, it is also a condition for the application of the Regu-
lation that this obligation will apply to goods supplied by an-
other member of the franchise network that honors a similar
guarantee.88 This position is in conformity with the Commis-
sion's position regarding the application of a European-wide
guarantee.8 9 This obligation does not, however, prevent the
possibility of setting up a parallel network that would offer a
less extensive guarantee.90
The payment by the franchisee of financial consideration
to the franchisor is also considered as a condition for the appli-
cation of the Regulation, since it is included in the definition of
the franchise agreement for the purposes of the Regulation.9 '
It is provided that the financial consideration may be direct or
indirect, which takes into account that there are not always roy-
alties or an initial payment, in particular, when the franchise
concerns the franchisor's products. The payment, therefore,
may be included in the price of the goods supplied by the
franchisor, as long as it is identifiable.
87. Id. art. 4(c), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307; see, e.g., Computerland, supra note 37, at
19, 24(iii), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,906, at 12,173.
88. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 4(b), at 50, reprinted infra pp. 306-
07.
89. See, e.g., Comm'n, Sixteenth Report on Competition Policy 56 (1987)
(Commission restating its consistent position that "guarantees offered as part of af-
ter-sales service by manufacturers of consumer durables must be valid throughout
the Community regardless of the Member State in which the product is purchased");
see also ETA v. DK Investment (Swatch), Case 31/85, 1985 E.C.R. 3933, 3943-44,
10-14, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,276, at 16,688; Regulation 123/85, supra note
42, recital 12, at 18, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1971.
90. See Hasselblad v. Commission, Case 86/82, 1984 E.C.R. 883, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,014.
91. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(3)(b), at 48, reprinted infra p.
1989] 259
260 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:242
B. Different Kinds of Franchising Systems
The definition of franchise agreement given in the Regula-
tion can be seen as comprising two parts: first, the general def-
inition is given, and second, the scope of the Regulation is lim-
ited to certain kinds of franchising systems, i.e., distribution
and service franchises for end-users. It is necessary, therefore,
to examine the different kinds of franchises and determine why
certain franchises are not covered by the Regulation.
1. Industrial Franchises
An industrial franchise usually consists of an agreement by
which one producer grants another producer the right to man-
ufacture certain goods and market them under its trademark.
It can be analyzed as a trademark license combined with a
manufacturing license based on patents or know-how. This
kind of agreement is not covered by the Franchising Regula-
tion, because it raises different issues than are raised by prod-
uct or service franchises. 92 An industrial franchise normally re-
lates to a horizontal relationship between potentially competi-
tive producers, while the Franchising Regulation covers
agreements involving a vertical relationship between a pro-
ducer or distributor and a retailer.
Industrial franchise agreements should often be able to
benefit from the patent-licensing regulation 93 or the Know-
How Regulation 94 if they fulfill the necessary conditions for the
application of these regulations and, in particular, if substantial
industrial property rights are involved. Where the distributor
or franchisee only performs additional operations to improve
the quality, durability, appearance, or taste of the product, the
agreement may also be covered by Regulation 1983/83, 95 as it
is interpreted by the relevant Commission's notice. 96
92. Id. recital 4, at 46, reprinted infra p. 298.
93. Comm'n Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15 (1984), Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2747 (on patent licensing).
94. Know-How Regulation, supra note 72.
95. See supra note 4.
96. See Commission Notice on Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83, Oj. C 101/2,
at 3, 10 (1984), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,583, at 11,368 [hereinafter Com-
mission Notice]. The notice gives such examples as "rustproofing of metals, steriliza-
tion of food or the addition of colouring matter or flavouring to drugs" and specifies
that the Commission's position as to the applicability of the Regulation will depend
on how much value adds to the goods:
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Industrial franchise agreements can also be the object of
individual exemption, under the principles of the Commis-
sion's administrative practice relating to licensing agreements.
The only decision concerning an industrial franchise is the
Campari decision of December 23, 1977, concerning licensing
agreements for the manufacture and sale of spirits under the
Campari trademark.17 This decision exempts, in particular,
the obligation on the licensees not to deal in competing prod-
ucts and not to actively market the licensed products outside
their territory. It considers as non-restrictive an obligation on
the licensees to follow the instructions of the licensor and buy
exclusively from him certain secret ingredients; the same ap-
plies to an obligation to carry out advertising, not to disclose
the licensed know-how, and not to assign their rights without
the licensor's consent.98
2. Distribution and Service Franchises
The Franchising Regulation applies equally to franchising
systems relating to the distribution of goods or the provision
of services. Although the Pronuptia judgment only concerned
distribution franchises, 99 the Commission found that the prin-
ciples expressed in that judgment could apply to service
franchises.
The examination of existing systems actually shows that
distribution and service franchises do not constitute two
clearly distinct categories, but that most systems include both
types of franchises in varying proportions. Pure distribution
franchises, without provisions for any service, are quite rare,
because the resale of goods is usually accompanied by at least
some customer services. The practice of the Commission
shows this mix in, for example, the Computerland decision,
where the franchisees provided sales advice, after-sale services,
Only a slight addition in value can be taken not to change the economic
identity of the goods .... The Commission applies the same principles to
agreements under which the reseller is supplied with a concentrated extract
for a drink which he has to dilute with water, pure alcohol or another liquid
and to bottle before reselling.
Id.
97. Campari, O.J. L 70/69 (1978), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,035.
98. Id. at 74, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,035, at 10,203.
99. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 380-81, 13, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,438.
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and training courses, 10 and the Yves Rocher decision, where the
franchisees undertook to give beauty treatments.'
In the case of service franchises, there is also usually a
product that results from the service, for instance, keys in key
reproduction franchises or soles in shoe repair franchises.
Even for service franchises where no product is sold to the cus-
tomers, such as car rentals or hotels, products are used for the
provision of the services and competition restrictions can be
involved with respect to the supply of these products. In the
Commission's ServiceMaster decision, which concerned the noti-
fied agreement of a franchise for cleaning services, it is speci-
fied that the franchisees must use the franchisor's cleaning
products and can resell them to their customers. 0 2 However,
this reselling activity is only collateral to their main activity as
providers of services.
Therefore, from the point of view of competition law,
there does not appear to be a difference in nature between dis-
tribution and service franchises that should justify a difference
of treatment. The Regulation takes into account the peculiari-
ties of service franchises in dealing with the obligations that
may be imposed on the franchisees but applies the same prin-
ciples to all franchise agreements, particularly those regarding
territorial protection.10 3
3. Wholesale and Retail Franchises
The Regulation covers only the selling of products or pro-
vision of services to end-users. End-users include professional
users as long as they do not buy only to resell to third parties,
but instead use the goods sold by the franchisees to sell other
goods or provide services. 104 Furthermore, the franchisees
must be free to sell products that are the subject of the
100. See Computerland, supra note 37, at 12, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,906, at 12,166-67. The decision concludes, however, that the system constituted a
distribution franchise, because the services were only accessories to the resale of
goods. Id. at 16, 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,906, at 12,170-71.
101. See Yves Rocher, supra note 36, at 51, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,855, at 12,049. The same paragraph specifies that these treatments only account
for a small proportion of their turnover. Id.
102. See ServiceMaster, supra note 38, at 38-39, 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
11,047, at 12,546.
103. See infra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
104. It is specified in the Computerland decision that most of the franchisees' cus-
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franchise to other franchisees or sell to resellers within other
channels of distribution supplied by the manufacturer of these
goods or with its consent.' 0 5 This provision only aims at
avoiding market partitioning and does not contradict the fact
that the franchisees must concentrate their activity on retailing.
The Regulation, therefore, does not cover wholesale
franchises, i.e., systems where the franchisees act as wholesal-
ers. This is due to the fact that such systems raise different
competition problems than retail franchises, in particular in re-
lation to parallel imports. The small number of agreements of
this nature known by the Commission seems to indicate that
there is no mass problem that would justify a block exemption
regulation; furthermore, in that field the Commission would
lack the necessary experience required by Regulation 19/65 to
prepare a block exemption regulation. 10 6 This does not mean
that such agreements are incompatible with Article 85, but if
they fall under paragraph 1 of this Article, they would have to
be exempted under Article 85(3) by individual decisions.
4. Master Franchises
Unlike wholesale franchises, the Regulation expressly cov-
ers master franchise agreements, that is, two-tiered franchises
where the franchisor grants a master franchisee the right to
enter into agreements with other parties, the franchisees, to
give them the right to exploit the franchise in a given terri-
tory.'0 7 The Regulation indicates that, "[w]here applicable,
[its provisions] concerning the relationship between franchisor
and franchisee shall apply mutatis mutandis to the relationship
between franchisor and master franchisee and between master
franchisee and franchisee."' 0 8 The Regulation also specifically
exempts an obligation on the master franchisee not to con-
clude franchise agreements with franchisees outside its con-
tract territory.'0 9 Master franchise agreements are particularly
tomers are business users. Computerland, supra note 37, at 12, 2, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,906, at 12,166-67.
105. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
107. See LELOUP, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DE LA FRANCHISE B29 (1983); Konigsberg,
Agreements Commonly in Use in International Franchise Arrangements, Part One: Master
Franchise Agreements, J. INT'L FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L., June 1987, at 162.
108. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(2), at 48, reprinted infra p. 302.
109. See infra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
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important for international franchisors, who can rely on one
single company to develop the franchise in a large territory,
usually a whole country. ° Another form of market penetra-
tion for international franchisors is the area development
agreement, where a franchisee, or area developer, undertakes
to open a certain number of franchises in a given territory,
during a given time. The difference between the master fran-
chisee and the area developer is that the latter does not have
the right to sub-franchise and is obliged to open all franchised
outlets itself."' It has been argued that the Regulation should
include specific provisions for development agreements. 1 2
This, however, does not seem to be necessary. Although the
Regulation does not mention such agreements, they are also
covered by the block exemption, because article 2(c) exempts
an obligation on the franchisee to exploit the franchise only
from the contract premises." 3 It does not limit the number of
premises that should be used by the franchisee to exploit the
franchise in its territory.' 14
C. Sectoral Field of Application of the Block Exemption
1. Reason for Application to All Economic Sectors
The existence of specific block exemption regulations for
vertical agreements in the sectors of motor vehicles,' service
stations," 6 and beer supply" 7 raises the problem of the rela-
tionship among these different regulations. Two options were
110. See Zeidman, Pronuptia-the International Perspective, J. INT'L FRANCHISING &
DISTRIBUTION L., Sept. 1986, at 5, 5-6.
111. See Konigsberg, Agreements Commonly in Use in International Franchise Arrange-
ments, Part Two: Development Agreements and Multiple Unit Franchise Agreements, J. INT'L
FRANCHISING & DISTRIBUTION L., Sept. 1987, at 7. In the case of multiple unit
franchise agreement, a franchisee has the right to open more than one franchise out-
let in a given area but without exclusivity; each new outlet is subject to the
franchisor's approval. See id. at 12-13.
112. See Zeidman & Renz, Will Master Franchise Agreements be Covered by the Proposed
Block Exemption Regulation for Franchising Agreements?, J. INT'L FRANCHISING & DISTRIBU-
TION L., Dec. 1987, at 84.
113. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(c), at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
114. In Computerland, supra note 37, at 22, 36, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,906, at 12,176, the exemption was granted mutatis mutandis to the area develop-
ment agreements involved.
115. Regulation 123/85, supra note 42.
116. Comm'n Regulation No. 1984/83, tit. III, O.J. L 173/5, at 10 (1983), Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1912-13.
117. Id. tit. II, at 9-10, Common Mkt, Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1910-12.
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conceivable: either decide that the Franchising Regulation
would not apply in sectors where specific regulations had al-
ready been adopted, or decide that agreements fulfilling the
conditions set out in the Franchising Regulation could not also
benefit from another block exemption, whatever the sector
concerned.
The first approach would have been based on the consid-
eration that there are only limited differences between
franchising and other distribution systems, primarily selective
distribution and exclusive purchasing agreements. The rea-
soning followed by the Commission in adopting specific provi-
sions concerning distribution in the sectors of motor vehicles,
service stations, and beer is because of the particularities of
their economic structure."' This reasoning should, therefore,
also be applied to exclude the application of the Franchising
Regulation to such sectors. The Regulation would then have
included a provision stating that it did not apply to agreements
concluded in sectors where a specific block exemption for ex-
clusive distribution or purchasing agreements had been
adopted.
The Commission did not retain that approach but stipu-
lated, to the contrary, the following:
Agreements may benefit from the provisions either of [the
Franchising Regulation] or of another Regulation, accord-
ing to their particular nature and provided that they fulfil
the necessary conditions of application. They may not ben-
efit from a combination of the provisions of [the Franchis-
ing Regulation] with those of another block exemption Reg-
ulation.' 1 9
This means that only franchise agreements that have all restric-
tions covered by the Franchising Regulation are deemed to be
automatically exempted and that franchise agreements that in-
clude restrictions that are not covered by it are not automati-
cally exempted, even if these restrictions were covered by an-
other block exemption. This condition results from the fact
that the Regulation is based on a global assessment of the re-
118. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, recital 3, at 16, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2751, at 1970; Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, recital 12, at 6, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1906.
119. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, recital 17, at 48, reprinted infra p.
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strictions and other obligations that are necessary to reach the
advantages brought about by the franchise agreements. The
addition of other restrictions that may be considered accepta-
ble in the framework of other agreements would destroy that
balance. However, agreements that satisfy the conditions set
out in article 4 and do not include any provision listed in the
"black list" of artiIcle 5 may benefit naturally from the opposi-
tion procedure.
2. Differences Between Franchise and Other Agreements
The refusal to exclude the application of the Franchising
Regulation in certain sectors results from the consideration,
expressed by the Court of Justice, that franchise agreements
are different in nature from distribution and exclusive purchas-
ing agreements. 2 The Court of Justice considered that
franchise agreements enable the franchisor to exploit its
knowledge without risking its own capital, provide franchisees
without any substantial experience access to the franchisor's
methods, and enable franchisees to benefit from the reputation
of the franchisor's sign.' 2 1 It concluded that distribution
franchise agreements differ from exclusive dealing or selective
distribution agreements, because these do not include the util-
ization of the same shop sign, the application of uniform com-
mercial methods, and the payment of royalties. 22 In the Reg-
ulation, the Commission considers that the application of uni-
form commercial methods results from the communication of
know-how and the provision of continuing assistance. Four
main differences, therefore, can be emphasized.
The first relates to the use of a common name or shop
sign, which gives the network its uniform appearance. 23 Only
the name of the franchisori appears on the shop front, and the
120. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 387, 33, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,441.
121. Id. Demaret reasonably remarks that these conditions are not always met,
as the franchisor sometimes supplies the premises used by the franchisee, thereby
investing some capital, and that the franchisee may already have some experience.
More than criteria, these are characteristics often found in franchise agreements.
Demaret, supra note 32, at 731.
122. See Pr6nuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 381, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,438.
123. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. l(1)(b), at 48, reprinted infra
p. 302.
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franchisee is obliged not to develop a separate goodwill at-
tached to its name. This should not prevent the possibility of
indicating that the franchisee is an independent undertaking,
thus avoiding the possibility of giving a misleading impression
to consumers. However, this indication must be made in a way
that does not jeopardize the uniformity of the network. 124 The
fact that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of consumers is di-
rectly linked to the name of the franchisor justifies, in particu-
lar, the franchisor exercising a tighter control on the franchis-
ees to maintain the reputation of its network. In the case of
-automobile or beer distribution agreements, the trademark of
the car manufacturer or brewer is also displayed on the shop
sign, but it is always in conjunction with either the dealer's
trade name or the name of the premises. The consumer,
therefore, will link the name of the manufacturer with the
product and the name of the dealer or of the premises with the
service he received.
The second element is the communication of substantial
know-how devised and experienced by the franchisor. 125 This
reveals a different, and even opposed, strategy for the expan-
sion of a selective distribution network as compared with
franchising. In the first case, the manufacturer relies mainly on
the know-how of traders that are already established and have
experience in the sector. The franchisor, on the contrary, usu-
ally looks for candidates that either are not yet established as
independent traders or were active in a different sector. The
main criterion for selection is, apart from having the necessary
capital, the aptitude to apply the methods developed by the
franchisor.' 26 Franchising, therefore, may be a way for a new
entrant in a market to develop a network independent from
existing distributors, who are already linked to other manufac-
turers.
The third factor is a consequence of the former: because
of the relative inexperience of the franchisees, the successful
application of the franchisor's methods cannot be limited to
the initial communication of know-how by the franchisor but
124. Id. recital 12, at 47, reprinted infra p. 300.
125. See Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 381-82, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,438-39.
126. See M. MENDELSOHN, THE GUIDE TO FRANCHISING 66-67 (4th ed. 1985).
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must be supported by an updating of that know-how by the
franchisor's continuing assistance.127 Even if such assistance is
present in certain cases of selective distribution, its importance
is more limited because of the pre-existing experience of the
dealers.
Finally, franchise agreements are characterized by the pay-
ment of a financial consideration. This characteristic, which
does not exist in selective distribution or exclusive purchasing
agreements, results from the communication of industrial
property rights and the fact that the franchisees do not neces-
sarily buy products from the franchisor. This is, however, a
criterion that is more difficult to assess, because the compensa-
tion may be made in different forms.'
28
3. Consequence of the Differences
The consequence of the differences examined above is
that agreements presently covered by Regulations 1984/84 or
123/85 will not benefit from the Franchising Regulation, be-
cause they do not fulfill the conditions for its application.
However, the fact that the Commission has exempted certain
kinds of agreements for these sectors does not mean that only
agreements of that nature may be concluded. 29 On the con-
trary, the coexistence of agreements of different natures in a
given sector favors competition, and the exclusion of certain
sectors from the block exemption would have created discrimi-
nation against those undertakings. It will, therefore, be possi-
ble to create new networks by concluding franchise agree-
ments covered by the Franchising Regulation.
In addition, it will be possible to replace existing selective
distribution or exclusive purchasing agreements by franchise
agreements covered by the Franchising Regulation. This, of
course, will not imply just changing the name of the agree-
127. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(3)(b), at 48, reprinted infra p.
302.
128. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., V.A.G. France v. Etablissements Magne, Case 10/86, 1986 E.C.R.
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,390. In VA.G. France, the Court ofJustice specifi-
cally considered that Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, exempting motor car distri-
bution agreements, does not set up provisions directly affecting the validity of agree-
ments or oblige the contracting parties to adapt the contents of their contacts to its
provisions. VA.G. France, 1986 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,390, at
17,607.
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ments but concluding new agreements satisfying all the condi-
tions set out by the Franchising Regulation. The condition re-
lating to the uniformity of the network will be easy to verify.
The premises, or vehicles, in the case of mobile franchises,
should be identical or closely similar and carry only the name
of the franchisor: The communication of substantial know-
how would seem to be more difficult to assess.1 30 However, in
the Pronuptia case, the Court of Justice gave some guidance. 1 3 '
In deciding that a non-competition clause, even for a reason-
able period after termination of the contract, does not fall
under Article 85, the Court stressed the necessity of protecting
the franchisor's know-how.132 The definition of substantiality
in article 1(3)(h) of the Regulation clarifies how this assess-
ment should be made: the know-how should be "capable, at
the date of conclusion of the agreement, of improving the
competitive position of the franchisee, in particular, by im-
proving the franchisee's performance or helping it to enter a
new market."1 33 In a network where the franchisees are mainly
new entrants without experience, the know-how communi-
cated by the franchisor could be quite basic. However, if the
franchisor wants to deal with undertakings already present in
the market, such as car dealers, it will be necessary to demon-
strate that the franchisor's know-how represents a substantial
improvement over the know-how previously obtained by the
franchisee.
D. Market Considerations
The Franchising Regulation will not apply if it appears
from the position of the parties to an agreement that it could
lead to market partitioning. Article 5(a), therefore, excludes
the application of the Regulation to agreements between com-
petitors. 34 This situation could arise mainly in connection
with master franchise agreements.
130. See Demaret, Selective Distribution and EEC Law After the Ford, Pronuptia and
Metro HJudgments, in 1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 149, 182 (B. Hawk ed. 1987) (car
dealerships would probably pass the test but not service station agreements).
131. Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 381-82, 16, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,438-39.
132. Id.; see infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
133. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(3)(h), at 49, reprinted infra p.
303.
134. Id. art. 5(a), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
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The Regulation also provides that the Commission may
withdraw the benefit of the exemption where competition or
access to the market is restricted because of the cumulative ef-
fect of parallel networks of similar agreements. In that case,
because of the rigidity of the market, even agreements fulfilling
all the conditions of the Regulation might have effects incom-
patible with the conditions laid down in Article 85(3).13 The
same applies in cases where, in a substantial part of the Com-
mon Market, the goods or services that are the subject of the
franchise do not face effective competition from, the identical
or similar goods or services. 136
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION
A. Territorial Protection
The Regulation exempts the practice of protecting the
franchisee against direct competition from the franchisor, who
may itself not undertake either to exploit the franchise in the
contract territory or to sell directly the "franchisor's prod-
ucts"1 37 to resellers or end-users in that territory. 138 This obli-
gation is similar to what is exempted by articles 1 and 2(1) of
Regulation 1983/8313 and should be interpreted in the same
way. This would not prohibit the manufacturer from supplying
its goods to other resellers, who may afterwards sell them in
the contract territory, if it supplies the goods only at the re-
seller's request and the goods are handed over outside the ter-
ritory. 4 0
The franchisee may also be protected from active competi-
135. See id. art. 8(a), at 51, reprinted infra p. 310. A similar concept is mentioned
in the De Minimis Notice, supra note 17, at 4, 16, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2700,
at 1854.
136. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 8(c), at 51, reprinted infra p.
xxx; similar provisions are included in Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, art. 10(1),
at 23, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1979; Regulation 2349/84, supra note
56, art. 9(2), at 23, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747, at 1961; Regulation 1984/83,
supra note 4, art. 14(a), at 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1913; Regulation
1983/83, supra note 4, art. 6(a), at 4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1895.
137. As defined in Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 1(3)(d), at 48, re-
printed infra p. 303; see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
138. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(a), at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
139. See Regulation 1983/83, supra note 4, arts. 1, 2(1), at 2-3, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1893.
140. See Commission Notice, supra note 96, at 5, 27, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,583, at 11,370-71.
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tion by other franchisees, as the franchisor may decide that no
other company will be granted the right to exploit the
franchise in the contract territory. This, however, can never
amount to absolute territorial protection, as the franchisor may
only impose on the franchisees an obligation not to seek cus-
tomers outside their territory.' 4 ' A "location clause," or an
obligation on the franchisee to exploit the franchise only from
the contract premises, is also exempted. In the case of mobile
service franchises this obligation relates to the base from which
the franchisee exploits the franchise.'4
The obligations relating to territorial protection constitute
one of the main subjects of the Regulation. According to the
Court ofJustice, provisions organizing a sharing of markets be-
tween the franchisor and franchisees or among the franchisees
fall under the prohibition of Article 85(1).' 1 3 This is the case
when a provision obliging the franchisee to sell only from the
contract premises (location clause) is combined with provi-
sions granting the franchisee exclusivity in a given territory for
the use of the licensed sign. The Court of Justice considers,
however, that this territorial protection of the franchisee might
be necessary to ensure a minimium profitability of the
franchised outlet, thereby justifying an exemption under Arti-
cle 85(3). 1 1 In its reasoning in Pronuptia, the Court makes a
reference to the Grundig judgment'4 5 and seems to limit the
applicability of Article 85(1) to agreements concerning a trade-
mark whose use is already widespread. 14 6 However, this limita-
tion is not repeated in the operative part of the judgment and
its object seems only to recall that Article 85(1) will not apply
to agreements that are not capable of affecting trade between
Member States. 147
141. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(d), at 49, reprinted infra p.
304.
142. See id. arts. 1(3)(e), 2(c), at 48, 49, reprinted infra pp. 303-04.
143. Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 385, 27, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,245, at 16,442.
144. See id. at 383-84, 7 23-24, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,439-
40.
145. Consten and Grundig v. Commission, Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, 1966
E.C.R. 299, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046.
146. See Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 384, 24, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,245, at 16,439-40.
147. This point has been the object of several comments. See Dubois, supra note
60, at 132. Venit, supra note 7, at 218, considers that territorial restrictions would
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It could be argued that the Regulation is more restrictive
than the Court of Justice, as it analyzes the territorial protec-
tion and the location clause as two separate restrictions, 148
while the Court indicated that their combination led to a shar-
ing of markets prohibited by Article 85(1). 41 Until now, the
Commission adopted the same position in its individual deci-
sions.' 50 However, it appears that an obligation to carry on the
exploitation of the franchise only from the premises described
in the contract is a restriction of competition, as it prevents the
franchisee from opening a second outlet. On the other hand,
the fact that the franchisee can exploit the franchise only from
premises approved by the franchisor is not a restriction of
competition and is covered by article 3(2)(i) of the Regula-
tion.'
The Regulation would not apply if the franchisees were
obliged not to supply within the territory goods or services
that are the subject of the franchise to end-users because of
their place of residence. 52 The block exemption could be
withdrawn if in practice the agreement were applied in such a
way that the users were prevented, because of their place of
residence, from obtaining the goods or services that are the
have to be assessed under Article 85(3) only in the case of a widespread trademark,
while it could be done under Article 85(1) in the case of a new entrant on the market.
Green, supra note 16, at 197, remarks that although it can be argued that the Court
alluded to the fact that a franchise incorporating a new name might not fall under
Article 85(1), one cannot make this assertion with absolute confidence, since it was
made by the Court in a very backhanded manner. Waelbroeck, supra note 7, at 219,
rightly remarks that the analogy made by the Court with the Grundigjudgment seems
misplaced, since that case concerned a situation where wholesalers and distributors
were prohibited from exporting, while such obligation did not exist in the Pronuptia
case.
148. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, arts. 2(c), 3(l)(c), at 49, reprinted
infra pp. 304-05.
149. See Grundig, 1966 E.C.R. at 343, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046, at
7653.
150. See, e.g., Computerland, supra note 37, at 19, 25, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,906, at 12,174; Yves Rocher, supra note 36, at 56, 54, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,855, at 12,055; Pronuptia, supra note 35, at 45, 28, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,044. The last decision even specifies that the obligation to carry on the
franchised business from the premises approved by the franchisor does not fall
within Article 85(1). Id. at 43-44, 25(ii), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,854, at
12,043.
151. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(2)(i), at 50, reprinted infra p.
306.
152. See id. art. 5(g), at 50, reprinted infra p. 308.
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subject of the franchise or if the agreement uses different
Member States' specifications in order to isolate markets. 153
This means that the franchisees are only protected against ac-
tive competition from other franchisees.
This approach is in line with the consistent positions of
the Commission and the Court of Justice in relation to exclu-
sive or selective distribution, 5 4 according to which there
would be no absolute territorial protection for distributors, so
that parallel imports always remain possible.
The Regulation also exempts an obligation on the master
franchisee not to conclude agreements with franchisees
outside its territory.' 55 This obligation restricts competition,
as it is also a partitioning of the market. However, it may be
considered necessary to guarantee that the master franchisee
concentrates its efforts to develop the franchise in its territory.
A similar reasoning has been adopted in connection with mo-
tor vehicle distribution. 56
B. Exclusive Dealing and Non-Competition Obligations
The Regulation makes an important distinction between
the franchisor's goods, defined as goods manufactured by the
franchisor or according to its instructions and/or bearing the
franchisor's brands,' 57 and other goods.
1. Franchisor's Goods
As regards the franchisor's goods, the Regulation exempts
an exclusive dealing obligation: the franchisee may be obliged
not to manufacture, distribute, or use in the process of provid-
ing services goods competing with the franchisor's goods that
form the subject of the franchise. However, this obligation
cannot be imposed for accessories or spare parts for those
153. See id. art. 8(c), (e), at 51, reprinted infra p. 310.
154. See, e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1907-08,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7851-52; Consten and Grundig v. Commission,
Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 345, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046,
at 7654; Grundig, O.J. L 233/1, at 6 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,701, at
11,639-8.
155. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(b), at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
156. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, recital 9, art. 3(9), at 17, 20, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1971, 1974.
157. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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goods. These accessories or spare parts are subject to the
same provisions as products other than the franchisor's prod-
ucts.
158
For both categories of products, the Regulation refers not
only to the products sold but also to those used in the process
of the provision of services. This expression covers both prod-
ucts "consumed" for the provision of services (such as soles
for shoe repair franchises) and machines or equipment neces-
sary to provide the services.' 59
Neither of these provisions amounts to allowing an exclu-
sive purchasing obligation, since the franchisee must be free to
obtain from other franchisees or distributors the goods that
are the subject of the franchise, if those goods are also distrib-
uted through other channels by their manufacturer or with its
consent. 160 This condition has been emphasized by the Court
of Justice 16 ' and is in line with previous case law concerning
distribution agreements. 162
The distinction between franchisor's products and other
products was not made by the Court of Justice in Pronuptia.
The Court considered as non-restrictive only an obligation on
the franchisee to deal exclusively with the products of the
franchisor, or producers designated by it, when it was impracti-
cable to formulate objective quality criteria or too expensive to
ensure that those criteria are observed. 63 The basis for the
distinction made by the Commission is that where the
franchisor markets products under its trademark, the franchise
formula is used by it to sell the largest possible quantities of its
products.' 64 The nature of such a franchise is, therefore, dif-
158. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(l)(a)-(b), at 49, reprinted infra
pp. 304-05.
159. See ServiceMaster, supra note 38, at 40, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
11,047, at 12,547-48.
160. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 4(a), at 50, reprinted infra p.
306.
161. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 383, 21, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,439.
162. See, e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435.
163. Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 383, 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245,
at 16,439. Goebel notes that it seems unfortunate that the ruling gives the impres-
sion that exclusive supply obligations are generally to be regarded as compatible with
Article 85(1). Goebel, supra note 7, at 697.
164. The Draft Regulation made a distinction between "producer franchise"
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ferent from the one identified by the Court of Justice, as it is,
indeed, mainly a mode of distribution. 65
In Yves Rocher, the Commission accepted an exclusive deal-
ing obligation on the grounds that the retailing of products
bearing trademarks other than that of the franchisor would ex-
pose it to the risk of the use of its know-how for the benefit of
competing producers and would detract from the identity of
the network, which is symbolized by the franchisor's sign.' 66
The franchisees were, however, free to sell accessories not
bearing the franchisor's trademark, under the condition that
the accessories were previously approved by the franchisor.
On the basis of its examination of the relevant facts and, in
particular, the structure of the market, 67 the Commission con-
sidered that these obligations did not fall under Article 85(1),
as they were inherent to the very nature of the Yves Rocher
distribution formula. 168
The Regulation confirms that an exclusive dealing provi-
sion relating to the franchisor's goods is acceptable, but on the
basis of a different rationale. It was considered impossible to
generalize the position taken in Yves Rocher, that such an obli-
gation was inherent to the nature of the franchising formula.
The Regulation, therefore, considers that an exclusive dealing
provision constitutes a restriction of competition under Article
85(1), as it prevents the franchisees from selling competing
products even if they are of the same quality.' 69 However, this
and "distributor franchise." Draft Regulation, supra note 21, recital 5, at 4; see
Pronuptia, 1986 E.C.R. at 380-81, 13, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at
16,438. This distinction emphasizes the fact that in one case the franchisor is a pro-
ducer whose first aim is to sell its goods, while in a "multibrand" franchise, such as
Computerland or a supermarket, the franchisor uses its trademark and know-how to
sell the products of third parties. This terminology was abandoned, because in a
large number of cases the franchisees sell both the franchisor's products and other
products. It was replaced by the distinction between the kind of purchasing restric-
tions admissible in relation with either category of products. Franchising Regulation,
supra note 22, recital 3, at 46, reprinted infra p. 297; see Korah, supra note 7, at 99.
165. Whereas the Court of Justice considered that the franchise system of
Pronuptia was more a way of exploiting knowledge and reputation. Pronuptia, 1986
'E.C.R. at 381, 15, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,053.
166. Yves Rocher, supra note 36, at 55, 45, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855,
at 12,053.
167. Id. at 50, 7, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,048.
168. Id. at 57, 63, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,056.
169. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(e), at 49, reprinted infra p.
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restriction is compatible with the objectives of Article 85(3),
because it guarantees that the franchisor's know-how is used
only to promote the sale of the franchisor's products and per-
mits a complete identification between the trademark of the
products sold and the sign on the shop. 171
The Regulation, therefore, allows the franchisor to estab-
lish a network of outlets bearing its trademark and selling only
goods bearing that trademark, as long as they form the essen-
tial object of the franchise. Where the object of the franchise
is, at the same time, to sell certain products and their accesso-
ries or spare parts, the franchisee must be free to sell compet-
ing accessories or spare parts of matching quality or, if no
specification of quality is practicable, such products made by
manufacturers agreed to by the franchisor.' 7 1 An exclusive
dealing obligation for these accessories or spare parts cannot
generally be considered indispensable to the achievement of
positive results from the franchise agreements, because the
sale of such products will not normally jeopardize the uniform
appearance of the network or prevent the franchisee from con-
centrating its efforts on the marketing of the franchisor's
goods or services. Similar reasoning is seen in the motor vehi-
cle distribution regulation. 72 An agreement that includes an
exclusive dealing obligation with a wider scope would be in-
cluded in the "black list" and, therefore, could not benefit
from the opposition procedure.' 73
2. Other Goods
For products other than the franchisor's products, the
Regulation considers as non-restrictive an obligation to deal
only with goods meeting minimum objective quality specifica-
tions laid down by the franchisor, insofar as it is necessary to
protect the franchisor's know-how or maintain the common
identity of the network. If the quality specifications were im-
posed on other grounds, the agreement should be submitted
to the opposition procedure. If, however, the franchisees were
170. See id. recital 9, at 47, reprinted infra p. 299.
171. Id.
172. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, recital 8, at 17, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2751, at 1970.
173. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 5(b)-(c), at 50, reprinted infra p.
307.
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prevented from obtaining supplies of goods of equivalent
quality to those proposed by the franchisor, the Regulation
would not apply, as it is specified that it does not apply if the
franchisee is prevented from obtaining goods of equivalent
quality to those proposed by the franchisor. 74
If it is impracticable to formulate such criteria, the fran-
chisees may be obliged to deal only in goods manufactured by
the franchisor or other producers designated by it. This condi-
tion finds its origin in the Pronuptia judgment, where the Court
gave two examples of such impracticability: the nature of the
products (in that case, fashion products) or the large number
of franchisees. 175 The term "impracticable" must be inter-
preted to cover cases where it is theoretically possible, but too
expensive, to apply such criteria. The Commission referred
only to the nature of the products, because the large number
of franchisees was considered to be too subjective a criterion
for a block exemption regulation. Agreements including an
exclusive dealing obligation where the nature of the products
makes it practicable to define objective quality criteria may
benefit from the opposition procedure insofar as it is possible
for the franchisee to obtain supplies of goods of equivalent
quality to those offered by the franchisor. On the other hand,
the exemption does not apply if the franchisor refuses to desig-
nate as authorized manufacturers, third parties proposed by
the franchisees for reasons other than protecting the
franchisor's industrial property rights or maintaining the com-
mon identity and reputation of the network. 176 The franchisor
must prove that the proposed manufacturers are not suitable.
The Community approach towards exclusive dealing obli-
gations is quite different from the U.S. approach. In the
United States, Martino v. McDonald's 177 held that an obligation
imposed by a franchisor on a franchisee to buy and use one
brand of cola does not constitute a per se illegal tie-in contrary
to section 1 of the Sherman Act 178 where the economic benefit
174. Id. art. 5(b), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
175. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 383, 21, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,439.
176. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 5(c), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
177. 625 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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to the franchisor is general. 179 It also does not violate the
Sherman Act under a rule-of-reason analysis, where the
franchisor has no economic interest in the sale of the brand
chosen but, rather, an interest in the linkage of the franchise
with a product that is well perceived by the consumers.' The
criterion to decide whether a tying arrangement is an exclusive
dealing obligation that constitutes a per se violation is whether
or not the franchisor has a "direct economic interest in the tied
product . "...'181 This criterion seems to be rather formalistic
as there may be indirect interests, such as special discounts to
the franchisees, which will not always be identifiable. On the
other hand, the Commission's position is based on the consid-
eration that an exclusive dealing obligation constitutes a tie-in
that restricts competition, because it prevents competing man-
ufacturers from selling through the franchise network, and this
obligation is not indispensable for the proper functioning of
the network if other products of equivalent quality exist.1 82
3. Non-Competition Obligation During the
Term of the Agreement
For the franchisor's 'goods, it should be stressed that an
exclusive dealing obligation that is exempted by the Regula-
tion makes it possible to oblige the franchisee not to manufac-
ture or sell goods competing with the franchisor's goods, with
the exception of spare parts or accessories for those goods. 18 3
For other goods, the Regulation considers as not restric-
tive, insofar as it is necessary to protect the franchisor's know-
how or to maintain the identity of the network, an obligation
not to engage directly or indirectly in a similar business, in a
territory where it would compete with a member of the
franchised network.' 8 4 This limitation was used by the Court
ofjustice in the Pronuptia judgment,185 and the Regulation con-
firms it with the specification that "member of the franchised
179. Martino, 625 F. Supp. at 362.
180. Id. at 363.
181. Id. at 362. But see Robert's Waikiki U-Drive v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 732 F.2d
1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1984) (interest need not be so direct).
182. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 5(b), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
183. See id. art. 2(e), at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
184. Id. art. 3(1)(c), at 49, reprinted infra p. 305.
185. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 381-82, 16, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,438-39.
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network" includes the franchisor. The ground for this territo-
rial limitation is that for such products, the franchisor's reve-
nue results from the royalties paid; it does not depend on
which products are sold but on the amount of business done
by its franchisees. As a consequence, there are no grounds to
protect the franchisor from the franchisee's competition where
the franchised network is not established. It should be noted
that an obligation on the franchisee not to use the franchisor's
know-how for purposes other than the exploitation of the
franchise applies without territorial limitation. 8 6 Further-
more, in cases where the franchisee is an individual, an obliga-
tion to use its best endeavors to exploit the franchise, 87 which
is considered as non-restrictive, may practically amount to an
obligation not to engage in any other business.
A non-competition obligation should not extend as far as
a complete prohibition on the franchisee from investing in any
competing business. The only restrictions that may be im-
posed on the franchisee's freedom of investment must bejusti-
fied by the need to avoid circumvention of a non-competition
obligation by investments of the franchisee. This would be the
case, in particular, if the franchisee were personally involved in
a competing company. The Regulation, therefore, considers
as non-restrictive an obligation on the franchisee not to ac-
quire a financial interest in a competing undertaking to an ex-
tent where the power to influence the economic conduct of
that undertaking would be present. 88
Agreements including more restrictive provisions, such as
a complete prohibition on investment in competing companies
or the prohibition of such investments that do not give the
franchisee a power to influence the conduct of the competing
enterprise, will have to be submitted to the opposition proce-
dure. The Commission, in its individual decisions, stressed
that franchisees were free to acquire financial interests in en-
terprises competing with the franchisor as long as it did not
involve them personally carrying on competing activities, or it
requested the franchisors to modify their agreements so that
186. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(2)(d), at 50, reprinted infra
p. 306.
187. Id. art. 3(l)(f), at 49, reprinted infra p. 305.
188. See id. art. 3(1)(d), at 49, reprinted infra p. 305.
1989] 279
280 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:242
this possibility could exist.' 89 In ServiceMaster, the Commission
observed:
Although the prohibition against acquiring non-controlling
financial interest in the capital of a competing publicly-
quoted company can be a restriction of competition falling
within Article 85(1), in this particular case it is not consid-
ered to be an appreciable restriction because the franchis-
ees are generally small undertakings for which the prohibi-
tion against acquiring more than 5% of a publicly-quoted
company does not normally constitute a real hindrance in
the development of their own activities.190
4. Post-Term Ban
The Regulation also considers as non-restrictive an obli-
gation not to engage in any similar business after termination
of the agreement, if the obligation is for a reasonable period,
not exceeding one year, and only applies in the territory where
the franchise was exploited.' 9 ' The Court ofJustice only made
a reference to a reasonable period 92 and the Commission has
never accepted a period greater than one year in its decisions.
In Pronuptia, the Commission specified that the post-term ban
provision of the agreement did not apply if the franchisee had
exploited the franchise for more than ten years, had fulfilled its
obligation, and did not join a competing network. 9 3 In Charles
Jourdan 194 there was no post-term ban, and it was specified that
because most of the franchisees already had some experience
in that sector before becoming franchisees, a post-term ban
would probably not have been accepted. 9 Regarding the ter-
189. See, e.g., ServiceMaster, supra note 38, at 39-40, 10, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 11,047, at 12,547 (franchisee was free to acquire financial interests of up to
five percent of capital of a publicly-quoted company); Computerland, supra note 37, at
17, 22(ii), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,906, at 12,171; Yves Rocher, supra note
36, at 52, 26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,855, at 12,051.
190. ServiceMaster, supra note 38, at 39-40, 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
11,047, at 12,547.
191. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(c), at 49, reprinted infra p.
305.
192. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 381-82, 16, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,438-39.
193. See Pronuptia, supra note 35, at 41, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,041.
194. See Charles Jourdan, supra note 39.
195. Id. at 36, 27.
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ritory where a non-competition obligation may apply, the
Court of Justice made no distinction between the period dur-
ing the validity of the agreement and the period following its
termination. In the Commission's decisions, apart from
Pronuptia, a post-term competition ban was stipulated only for
the territory where the franchisee had been exploiting the
franchise or for a smaller territory. 196
The rationale given by the Court ofJustice for considering
this obligation as non-restrictive is not entirely convincing.
The protection of the franchisor's know-how is already en-
sured by the obligations not to use the know-how after termi-
nation of the agreement and not to disclose the know-how to
third parties. The non-competition clause may be considered
useful, however, because it is usually difficult for the franchisor
to prove an unauthorized use of its know-how. It may also be
necessary to protect the goodwill of the franchise, which re-
sults from the franchisor's sign and commercial methods and
from the way in which they have been applied by the fran-
chisee.'9 7 If the franchisee were allowed to go on with a simi-
lar business at the same place where it once exploited the
franchise, the mere fact that the franchisor's brand would be
removed and the appearance of the outlet modified would not
avoid the risk of the former franchisee keeping the largest part
of its customers and could prevent the franchisor from profita-
bly setting-up a new franchised outlet in that area. The post-
term ban is, therefore, justified only in the area where the fran-
chisee has exploited the franchise.
However, the franchisee should not completely be pre-
vented from pursuing a similar business and from keeping
some of its customers. Furthermore, the territories are usually
such that the franchisee would be prevented from opening new
premises in the same town or in the main shopping area of the
same town. This is why the duration of the post-term ban
should be reasonable and should, in any case, not exceed one
196. See, e.g., ServiceMaster, supra note 38, at 39-40, 10, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 11,047, at 12,547.
197. Galan Corona notes that the post-term ban raises major problems but con-
siders that it is an application of the principles established in relation to the sale of a
business. Galan Corona, supra note 7, at 697.
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year,198 which in almost all cases will be sufficient to allow the
franchisee to set up new premises. A shorter period should
often be considered as reasonable where the franchisee was al-
ready active in that sector before joining the franchised net-
work, because it had already developed a know-how distinct
from the franchisor's, or where the franchise concerns
franchisor's products that are not distributed through other
channels, as the risk of confusion for the customers is then very
limited or non-existent.
Obligations on the franchisee after termination of the con-
tract that are less restrictive than a non-competition obligation,
for example, a prohibition of solicitation of former custom-
ers, 199 are also considered as not falling under Article 85(1).
On the other hand, agreements that include a post-term com-
petition ban for a period that cannot be considered as reason-
able or exceed one year must be submitted to the opposition
procedure.2 ° °
C. Price Restrictions
Two provisions relate to prices: 20 ' article 5(e) stipulates
that the Regulation does not apply when the franchisee is re-
stricted in the determination of its sale prices, but this does not
prevent the franchisor from recommending such prices.20 2
This means that in the case of a concerted practice between the
franchisor and its franchisees to maintain resale prices, the
Regulation will not apply and any national court could declare
the agreement contrary to Article 85 and, consequently, void.
Furthermore, article 8(d) specifies that the Commission may
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption when franchisees
engage in concerted practices among themselves relating to
the sale prices of the goods or services that are the object of
the franchise.20 3 In that case, a decision of the Commission is
198. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(c), at 49, reprinted infra p.
305.
199. See, e.g., ServiceMaster, supra note 38, at 40, 11, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
11,047, at 12,547.
200. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 6(1), at 50, reprinted infra p.
308.
201. Id. arts. 5(e), 8(d), at 50-5 1, reprinted infra pp. 307, 310.
202. Id. art. 5(e), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
203. Id. art. 8(d), at 51, reprinted infra p. 310.
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necessary to withdraw the benefit of the Regulation. 0 4
These provisions are closely related to the considerations
of the Court of Justice in the Pronuptia case, according to
which, the communication of recommended prices was not re-
strictive of competition as long as there was no accompanying
concerted practice.20 5 This position has been followed by the
Commission in its individual decisions,20 6 and the Regulation
confirms that the communication of recommended prices is
not a restriction, since it is not included among the exempted
restrictions but only mentioned as not preventing the applica-
tion of the Regulation.
Resale price maintenance, on the other hand, is prohibited
by Article 85(1), because it suppresses all intrabrand price
competition. The broad formulation used by the Regulation
covers not only fixed prices but also minimum or maximum
prices; the negative effect of minimum prices is self-evident,
and the Commission considers that maximum prices could
have the same effect as fixed prices in bringing consumer
prices to a uniform level. 20 7 This is in line with the case law of
the Court of Justice concerning selective distribution, accord-
ing to which, even if some limitation in price competition is
inherent in selective distribution systems, this competition
should never be eliminated.20 8 It is only in the sector of news-
papers that the Court has considered that resale price mainte-
nance might be exempted under Article 85(3) if it were the
only means for the publisher to finance the practice of taking
back unsold copies and the only means to offer a wide range of
press products to the public.20 9
204. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
205. See Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R. 353, 384, 25, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,440.
206. See Pronuptia, supra note 35, at 44, 26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,043-44; Yves Rocher, supra note 36, at 56, 51, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,855, at 12,054-55.
207. See, e.g., Yves Rocher, supra note 36, at 53, 34, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,855, at 12,052. The Commission mentions that before granting the exemption, it
requested Yves Rocher to avoid any reference in its circulars to the notion of maxi-
mum price and to issue a circular to its franchisees stressing that the recommended
prices were purely guidelines. Id.
208. See, e.g., Ford v. Commission, Joined Cases 25 & 26/84, 1985 E.C.R. 2725,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,144; Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R.
1875, 1904-05, 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7850.
209. See Binon v. AMP, Case 243/83, 1985 E.C.R. 2015, 2046, 46, Common
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It has been argued that the application of the concept of
concerted practices to resale price maintenance is ambiguous,
since the Court of Justice has defined concerted practices as
any direct or indirect contact between economic operators,
having as its object or effect either to influence the conduct of
a competitor or to inform it about the conduct that one intends
to adopt.21 ° This could be interpreted as meaning that the
mere fact that a price recommendation is followed by franchis-
ees could be deemed to amount to a concerted practice.21
However, it should be stressed that this definition of concerted
practice has been used by the Court of Justice only in the con-
text of horizontal agreements and actually refers to contacts
between competitors. The same reasoning cannot be trans-
posed to the relationship between manufacturer and distribu-
tor. The practice of the Commission and the case law of the
Court of Justice shows that in the case of vertical agreements,
recommended prices are condemned only if actions are taken
to implement them in a compulsory way.2 12 Indirect price fix-
ing, such as an obligation on a franchisee not to harm the
brand image of the franchisor by its pricing level, has also been
considered unacceptable.2 m3
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,218, at 16,327. On June 23, 1987, the Commission published its
intention to make a favorable decision in that case, subject to the condition that re-
sale price maintenance should not apply to parallel imports of newspapers. Notice
Pursuant to Article 19(3) of Regulation No. 17 Concerning Case IV/31.609-Agence
et Messageries de la Presse, OJ. C 164/2, at 3-4, 18 (1987).
210. See, e.g., Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-48, 50,
54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1942, 174, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8334, at 8179.
211. See Schroedermier, Die Pronuptia Entscheidung des EuGH, 36 WuW 670, 675
(Sept. 1986); Waelbroeck, supra note 7, at 221. But see Harris, Franchisees and 'Concerted
Practices,' J. INT'L FRANCHISING & DISTRIBtTIoN L., Dec. 1986, at 70, 71 (little likeli-
hood of breach of competition rules by following recommended prices).
212. See, e.g., Hasselblad, O.J. L 161/18, at 29, 32, 65-66, 76 (1982), Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,401, at 10,843, 10,846 ; AEG-Telefunken, O.J. L 117/15,
at 26, 68 (1982), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,366, at 10,787-16, aff'd, AEG v.
Commission, Case 107/82, 1983 E.C.R. 3151, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,018;
see Goebel, supra note 7, at 698-99.
213. See Pronuptia, supra note 35, at 41, 12(c), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,041. In Pronuptia, the Commission specified that a clause to this effect
had to be abolished before the Commission could grant an exemption. See id. In the
field of exclusive distribution, the Commission considered that the argument of
maintaining the brand image of a producer of luxury products (cognac) may not jus-
tify its intervention in its exclusive distributor's pricing policy. See Hennessy-Henkell,
O.J. L 383/11, at 16-17, 32-33 (1980), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,283, at
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D. Customer Restrictions
The Regulation considers as non-restrictive an obligation
on the franchisees to sell the products that are the subject of
the franchise only to end-users or to other members of the net-
work. When these products are also sold to other resellers
outside the network with the manufacturer's consent, the fran-
chisee can also supply such resellers. 2 4 This obligation has
already been considered as non-restrictive in the case of selec-
tive distribution 21 5 and in several decisions concerning
franchising.216 In Computerland, it was specified that an obliga-
tion on the franchisees not to supply resellers outside the net-
work is considered non-restrictive when the franchisees sell
products bearing the franchisor's name or trademark; this obli-
gation is, on the other hand, considered as restrictive when the
franchisees sell products from other manufacturers and are
prevented from supplying other qualified resellers. 21 7 The
Regulation is consistent with this position by accepting an obli-
gation to sell solely within the franchised network only if the
manufacturer of the goods does not market them through
other channels.21 8 On the other hand, if it also supplies agreed
dealers within a selective distribution system or any resellers,
the franchisees should be free to supply these dealers or resel-
lers.
E. Other Obligations Relating to the Control of the Network
Under the same qualification that applies to an obligation
to sell only products of a certain quality, 21 9 the Regulation con-
siders as non-restrictive an obligation on the franchisee to of-
10,657-7 to 10,657-8. On the other hand, the Commission has accepted that a manu-
facturer could prohibit dealers within a selective distribution system from advertising
that they were selling at "cash and carry" prices. Grundig, OJ. L 233/1, at 4 (1985),
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,701, at 11,639-6.
214. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(l)(e), at 49, reprinted infra p.
305.
215. See, e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1907-08, 4
26-27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7851-52.
216. See, e.g., Yves Rocher, supra note 36, at 55, 46, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,855, at 12,053-54.
217. Computerland, supra note 37, at 19-20, 26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,906, at 12,173-74.
218. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(a), (c), at 49, reprinted infra
p. 304.
219. Id. art. 3(1)(a), at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
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fer for sale a minimum range of products, to keep minimum
stocks, to achieve a minimum turnover, to plan its orders in
advance, to provide warranty services, and to use its best en-
deavors to sell the goods or services that are the subject of the
franchise. 220 These obligations, which would be considered as
restrictive of competition in a selective distribution system,2 '
are considered as not falling under Article 85(1) because of the
particular nature of the franchise agreement and, in particular,'
because of the importance of the industrial property rights li-
censed by the franchisor.222 However, these obligations
should be applied only to preserve the identity and reputation
of the network. This means, in particular, that they should be
applied in a non-discriminatory way to the franchisees.
The Regulation considers as non-restrictive certain obli-
gations on the franchisee relating to advertising, only insofar
as they are necessary to protect the franchisor's industrial
property rights or maintain the common identity and reputa-
tion of the network. The franchisee may be obliged to partici-
pate financially in the advertising done by the franchisor and
obtain the franchisor's approval for any advertising carried out
by the franchisee itself.2 23 The Regulation would, therefore,
not exempt an obligation that would allow the franchisor to
influence the pricing policy of the franchisees through control
of their advertising.22 4
In conformity with the Pronuptia judgments, the Regula-
tion lists as non-restrictive the other obligations necessary to
maintain the identity and the reputation of the network. These
include an obligation to attend any training courses offered by
the franchisor,225 apply its methods,226 comply with the
franchisor's standards for equipment and presentation of the
premises,2 2 7 and not to change the location of the premises228
220. Id. art. 3(l)(d), at 49, reprinted infra p. 305.
221. See, eg., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1913, 37,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7854.
222. See Pronuptia, supra note 35, at 44-45, 27, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,044.
223. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(l)(g), at 49, reprinted infra p.
305.
224. Id. art. 5(e), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
225. Id. art. 3(2)(e), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
226. Id. art. 3(2)(f), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
227. Id. art. 3( 2 )(g), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
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or assign its rights and obligations under the franchise agree-
ment without the franchisor's approval. 229 An obligation on
the franchisee to allow the franchisor to carry out checks on
the contract premises and of the contract vehicles, inventory,
and accounts of the franchisee is also considered as non-re-
strictive.2 30 The franchisor must be able, in particular, to ver-
ify that the goods sold or the services provided by the franchis-
ees are up to the standards of the network. The Regulation
specifies, however, that the Commission may withdraw the
benefit of the exemption when these checks on the franchisee
are used for different purposes. 23' This is in order to prevent
the franchisor from using these checks to isolate markets by
making it difficult for franchisees to supply other franchisees or
meet unsolicited orders from customers outside the contract
territory.
F. Know-How and Other Industrial Property Rights
It is essential for the protection of the franchisor's know-
how that the franchisee be obliged not to disclose it to third
parties. This obligation is, therefore, not restrictive of compe-
tition and may be imposed even after termination of the agree-
ment. The franchisee must also use the know-how and the
other industrial property rights licensed by the franchisor only
for the exploitation of the franchise and according to the in-
structions of the franchisor.2 32 This may include, in particular,
an obligation to use a trademark only in a particular way.2 33
For the know-how, this obligation may apply after termination
of the contract, as long as the know-how has not fallen into the
public domain. If the know-how has become publicly known,
the franchisees must be free to use it without limitation, other-
wise they would be placed at an unjustified competitive disad-
vantage vis-i-vis third parties. However, if the know-how en-
ters the public domain because of the actions of a franchisee,
228. Id. art. 3(2)(i), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
229. Id. art. 3(2)(j), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
230. Id. art. 3(2)(h), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
231. Id. art. 8(e), at 51, reprinted infra p. 310.
232. Id. art. 3(2)(a), (d), (f), at 49-50, reprinted infra pp. 305-06.
233. See Pronuptia, supra note 35, at 44, 26, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,854, at 12,043 (provision prohibiting franchisee from using Pronuptia trademark
other than in combination with its own business name and followed by words "Fran-
chisee of Pronuptia de Paris" did not fall within Art. 85(1)).
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that franchisee may not use the know-how after the termina-
tion of the agreement.234
Certain positive obligations of collaboration imposed on
the franchisee are also considered to be non-restrictive. This
is the case for a grantback obligation, i.e., an obligation to
communicate to the franchisor any experience gained in the
process of exploiting the franchise and to grant the franchisor
and the other franchisees a non-exclusive license for any know-
how resulting from that experience. 235 An obligation to assist
the franchisor in the case of an infringement of the licensed
industrial property rights is also considered to be outside the
scope of Article 85(1).236 On the other hand, an obligation on
the franchisee not to challenge the validity of the licensed in-
dustrial property rights would prevent the application of the
Regulation. 23' This does not refer to an obligation on the
franchisee to recognize the validity of the industrial property
rights at the moment of signature of the contract but only to an
obligation not to challenge them during the life of the agree-
ment. Such a no-challenge obligation would place the fran-
chisees at a disadvantage in comparison to their competitors
and without justification if some of these rights appeared to be
ill-founded, for example, if the franchisor's trademark had be-
come descriptive or generic or if anterior rights exist in the
case of a patent. The franchisor must be free to terminate the
contract in such a case. Article 3(3) provides that if, because of
particular circumstances, the obligations listed in article 3(2)
become restrictive of competition, they will also be covered by
the block exemption.238 On these different points, the
Franchising Regulation closely parallels the patent-licensing
regulation.23 9
The recent Bayer judgment 240 does not, in my view, ques-
tion the fact that a no-challenge obligation normally infringes
234. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 5(d), at 50, reprinted infra p. 307.
235. Id. art. 3(2)(b), at 49, reprinted infra p. 305.
236. Id. art. 3(2)(c), at 50, reprinted infra pp. 305-06.
237. Id. art. 5(f), at 50, reprinted infra pp. 307-08.
238. Id. art. 3(3), at 50, reprinted infra p. 306.
239. See Comm'n Regulation No. 2349/84 on Patent Licensing, arts. 2(l)(8),
2(l)(10), 3(1), O.J. L 219/15, at 20 (1984), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747, at
1956-57.
240. La Socikt Bayer AG v. Siullh6fer, Case 65/86, 1988 E.C.R. _; see Korah,
No Duty to License Independent Repairers to Make Spare Parts: The Renault, Volvo and Bayer
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Article 85(1); it is only in two exceptional circumstances-the
granting of a free license or the granting of a license concern-
ing an obsolete technology not used by the licensee-that the
Court of Justice has considered that a no-challenge clause was
not restrictive of competition. Neither of these situations is
likely to occur in the case of franchising.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the Franchising Regulation certainly
marks a change in the treatment of vertical restrictions under
EEC antitrust law. This new approach, however, is consistent
with the previous policy. It is interesting, in this respect, to
examine the differences among the various existing block ex-
emption regulations and what could be the main conse-
quences, from the point of view of the application of the EEC
competition rules, of the transformation of distribution or se-
lective purchasing agreements into franchise agreements, as-
suming that all the conditions of the Franchising Regulation
would be met. The consequences would vary according to the
type of pre-existing agreements.
A. Exclusive Distribution and Purchasing
The Franchising Regulation would not apply to non-recip-
rocal agreements between competitors, contrary to Regula-
tions 1983/83 and 1984/83;241 it would apply without limita-
tion as to the maximum duration of the agreements, contrary
to Regulation 1984/83.242
& Hennecke Cases, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 381, 384-86 (1988) (very critical of the
Bayer judgment).
241. See Regulation 1983/83, supra note 4, art. 3(b), at 3, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2730, at 1894. Regulation 1983/83 provides that the block exemption ap-
plies to non-reciprocal exclusive distribution agreements between competitors,
where at least one of the parties has a total turnover of no more than 100 million
ECU. Id.; see Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, art. 3(b), at 8, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2733, at 1909. Regulation 1984/83 includes the same provision for non-
reciprocal exclusive purchasing agreements. The Franchising Regulation, Regula-
tion 1983/83, and Regulation 1984/83 do not apply to reciprocal agreements be-
tween competitors.
242. See Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, art. 3(d), at 8, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2733, at 1909. Article 3(d) provides that it does not apply to agreements
concluded for an indefinite duration or for a period of more than five years; in the
case of beer supply agreements, article 8(1)(d) stipulates that the maximum period
can be 10 years. Id. art. 8(1)(d), at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1911.
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The territorial protection granted to the reseller would be
similar to what is provided in Regulation 1983/83243 but more
extensive than in Regulation 1984/83.44 The range of prod-
ucts covered by the exclusive dealing clause would be narrower
than in Regulation 1983/83 and similar to what is provided in
Regulation 1984/83 in either the general part or the sections
relating to beer supply and service stations agreements.24 5
The Franchising Regulation allows for a non-competition
clause for a period of up to one year after termination of the
contract, while both Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 ex-
empt a non-competition covenant only during the validity of
According to article 8(2)(a), where the agreement relates to premises let to the re-
seller by the supplier, the exemption applies for the whole period for which the re-
seller operates the premises. Id. art. 8(2)(a), at 9, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733,
at 1911. Articles 12(l)(c) and 12(2) establish similar provisions for service stations.
Id. art. 12(l)(c), (2), at 10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1912-13.
243. See Regulation 1983/83, supra note 4, art. 2(1), at 2-3, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2730, at 1893.
244. Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, art. 2(1), at 8, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2733, at 1909. No contract territory can be stipulated under Regulation
1984/83. Article 2(1) provides only that the supplier may be obliged not to under-
take to distribute the contract products "in the reseller's principal sales area and at
the reseller's level of distribution"; this means that the supplier is entitled to supply
other resellers in the same area. Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, art. 2(1), at 8,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1909. On the differences between the territo-
rial protection allowed under Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/84, see Commission
Notice, supra note 96, at 2, 4, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,583, at 11,367-68;
Schr6ter, The Application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to Distribution Agreements-Princi-
ples and Recent Developments, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 375, 416 (B. Hawk ed.
1985).
245. Article 2(e) of the Franchising Regulation exempts an obligation on the
franchisee not to manufacture or distribute goods competing with the franchisor's
goods that form the essential object of the franchise, with the exception of accesso-
ries or spare parts thereof. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(e), at 49,
reprinted infra p. 304. Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation 1983/83 exempts the obligation
on the reseller not to manufacture or distribute goods competing with the contract
goods, without any limitation as to the range of these products. Regulation 1983/83,
supra note 4, art. 2(2)(a), at 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1893. Article
2(2) of Regulation 1984/83 exempts a similar restriction, but article 3(c) of the same
Regulation excludes the application of the block exemption when the exclusive
purchasing obligation relates to several products that are not linked together either
by their nature or according to commercial use, while articles 6(l)(a) and 1 1(a) re-
spectively exempt the obligation not to sell beer or other drinks in one case and
motor vehicle fuel and other fuels in the other, i.e., the main products covered by the
agreement, which are supplied by other undertakings. Regulation 1984/83, supra
note 4, arts. 2(2), 3(c), 6(1), 11(a), at 8-10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at
1909-10, 1912.
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the agreement. 24 6 However, it should be stressed that the
Franchising Regulation does not cover an exclusive purchasing
obligation that is exempted by Regulation 1983/83247 and
forms the main object of agreements covered by Regulation
1984/83,248 as the franchisees should always be free to
purchase from other franchisees or other distributors within
other channels of distribution supplied by the manufacturer or
with its consent.
B. Selective Distribution
Restrictions resulting from selective distribution systems
are only acceptable for certain products. According to the
Court ofJustice, it is necessary to examine whether the proper-
ties of the product require a selective distribution system to
preserve the product's quality and ensure that it is used cor-
rectly. 249 The Commission has, for instance, refused to ex-
empt agreements concerning plumbing fittings, noting that the
characteristics of these products do not require a selective dis-
tribution system. 250 The Court of Justice did not establish a
similar condition for franchise agreements in the Pronuptia
case 251 and the Franchising Regulation does not include any
limitation of that nature.
Until now, it has been accepted only for motor vehicle dis-
tribution that selective distribution agreements could be based
246. Compare Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 3(1)(c), at 49, reprinted
infra p. 305 with Regulation 1983/83, supra note 4, art. 2(2)(a), at 3, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2730, at 1893 and Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, arts. 2(2), 7(l)(a),
ll(a), at 8-10, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1909-12.
247. Regulation 1983/83, supra note 4, art. 2(2)(b), at 3, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2730, at 1893 (providing that supplier impose on distributor "the obligation
to obtain the contract goods for resale only from the other party .... ").
248. See Regulation 1984/83, supra note 4, arts. 1, 6, 10, at 7, 9-10, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733, at 1908, 1910, 1912.
249. See, e.g., Lanc6me v. Etos, Case 99/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2511, 2536, 20, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8714, at 8593.
250. See Ideal Standard, O.J. L 20/38, at 41-42, 15 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,662, at 11,574-75; Grohe, OJ. L 19/17, at 20-21, 15 (1985), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,661, at 11,565-66. Demaret considers that these cases present
"intriguing horizontal aspects," as two leading manufacturers adopted the same mar-
keting policy. However, the motivation of the two decisions does not address that
question. Demaret, supra note 130, at 173.
251. The Court considered only that the characteristics of certain products
might justify exclusive dealing obligations. Pronuptia, Case 161/84, 1986 E.C.R.
353, 387, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245, at 16,441.
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on a quantitative selection of the dealers 2 2 and include an ob-
ligation to deal exclusively in the manufacturer's products.2 5 3
For other sectors, selective distribution agreements have been
considered as acceptable only if they were based on qualitative
selection criteria: agreements based on simple objective quali-
tative criteria do not fall under Article 85(1),254 while agree-
ments including additional restrictions, such as a minimum
turnover requirement, may obtain exemptions if they are ap-
plied in a non-discriminatory manner.2 55
In sectors other than motor vehicle distribution, the trans-
formation to franchise agreements would permit a quantitative
selection of the franchisees, because the Regulation exempts
an obligation on the franchisor to appoint only one franchisee
in a given territory;256 it also makes it possible to give a territo-
rial protection to the franchisees 2 7 and to impose exclusive
dealing and non-competition obligations.258
C. Motor Vehicle Distribution
In the area of motor vehicle distribution, contrary to Reg-
ulation 123/85, the Franchising Regulation does not impose
conditions relating to the protection of the dealers, such as a
minimum duration of the agreements 259 or specific rules for
the calculation of discounts.260 As far as the interests of the
users are concerned, the Franchising Regulation does not in-
252. See, e.g., Bayerische Motoren Werke, supra note 41, at 4-5, 6-7, T$ 13, 24, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9701, at 9539-7 to 9539-10 (specifying that quantitative
selection was only accepted, because motor cars are products of considerable value,
utilization of which can jeopardize life, health, and material goods and affect the envi-
ronment); see also Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, art. 1, at 19-20, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1973.
253. See Bayerische Motoren Werke, supra note 41, at 5, 7, 4 18, 28, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 9701, at 9539-8, 9539-11; see also Regulation 123/85, supra note 42,
recitals 7, 8, arts. 3(3), 5(2), at 17, 20-21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1970,
1974, 1976-77.
254. See, e.g., Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1904, 20,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7850.
255. See, e.g., id. at 1913, 37, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7854.
256. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 2(a), at 49, reprinted infra p.
304,
257. See id. art. 2(d), at 49, reprinted infra p. 304.
258. See id. arts. 2(a), 2(e), 3(l)(c), at 49, reprinted infra pp. 304-305.
259. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, art. 5(2)(2), at 22, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1977.
260. See id. art. 5(l)(2)(c), at 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1976.
FRANCHISING REGULATION
clude a condition relating to an obligation on the franchisee to
honor guarantees and to perform free servicing, 6' but it does
provide that where such a guarantee exists, it must be applied
in a non-discriminatory way.262 The practical result is the
same, however, because all motor vehicle manufacturers grant
a manufacturer's guarantee for their products. The Franchis-
ing Regulation also does not include as a condition an obliga-
tion on the manufacturer (franchisor) to supply a distributor
(franchisee), following a customer's request, with goods corre-
sponding to the norms applicable where the customer intends
to use the goods.263 However, the Franchising Regulation
does not apply when the franchisees are obliged not to supply
the goods or services that are the subject of the franchise to
end-users because of their place of residence. 64 It is also pro-
vided that the benefit of the exemption can be withdrawn when
the parties prevent the end-users from obtaining the goods
that are the subject of the franchise because of their place of
residence or if they use the differences in specifications con-
cerning these goods or services in different Member States to
isolate markets.26 5 Unlike Regulation 123/85, the Franchising
Regulation does not stipulate that an intermediary acting on
behalf of an end-user should comply with specific formalities
such as obtaining a prior written authority from the user. 266
The franchisees must be free to sell to end-users, whether they
act through intermediaries or not.
The scope of the admissible exclusive dealing clause dur-
ing the duration of the contract is similar in both Regulations.
The motor vehicle regulation refers to an obligation not to sell
new motor vehicles other than those within the contract pro-
gram 26 7 and not to sell or use competing spare parts that do
261. Regulation 123/85 does, however, include such a provision. Id. art.
5(1)(l)(a), at 21, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1976.
262. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 4(b), at 50, reprinted infra pp.
306-07.
263. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, art. 5(l)(2)(d), at 21, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1976.
264. See Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 5(g), at 50, reprinted infra p.
308.
265. Id. art. 8(c), at 51, reprinted infra p. 310.
266. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, art. 3(11), at 20, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2751, at 1974-75.
267. See id. art. 5(2), at 21-22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1976-77.
This assumes that the dealer has accepted the obligations for the imorovement of,
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not match the quality of the contract goods. 268 The corre-
sponding provisions of the Franchising Regulation refer to
goods competing with the franchisor's goods that are the sub-
ject of the franchise, with the exception of accessories or spare
parts for which only an obligation to match minimum objective
quality specifications laid down by the franchisor could be im-
posed.269
The Franchising Regulation also considers as non-restric-
tive a non-competition provision that applies after the termina-
tion of the agreement for a reasonable period not exceeding
one year.270 This is an important difference from Regulation
123/85, which only exempts, for a maximum period of one
year after termination of the -agreement, obligations relating to
the contract goods, such as obligations not to modify the
goods or sell them to resellers outside the distribution sys-
tem.27' However, the notion of "reasonable period" depends
on the value of the know-how to be protected and can be quite
short if the dealer was already experienced before concluding
the franchise agreement. Therefore, in the case of car dealers
that were already established in that sector before they became
franchisees, it is likely that a post-term competition ban would
be considered as reasonable only for a period of two to three
months.
Because the differences between the franchising block ex-
emption and other block exemptions result from the different
natures of the agreements in question, the transformation of
certain distribution networks into franchises should not have
any negative effect on overall competition. This might be dif-
ferent if in certain sectors nearly all manufacturers were to
adopt similar franchising systems. It should be remembered
that the Commission may withdraw the benefit of the exemp-
tion where an agreement covered by the Regulation, neverthe-
less, has effects incompatible with Article 85(3) of the Treaty.
distribution and servicing structures stipulated in article 4(l), which are similar to
what is normally found in a franchise agreement. See id. art. 4(l), at 20, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1975.
268. Id. art. 3(4), at 20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2751, at 1974.
269. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, arts. 2(e), 3(1)(a), at 49, reprinted in-
fra p. 304.
270. Id. art. 3(l)(c), at 49, reprinted infra p. 305.
271. See Regulation 123/85, supra note 42, art. 3(12), at 20, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2751, at 1975.
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Article 8(a) of the Regulation specifically refers, in that respect,
to a situation where competition or access to the market is re-
stricted because of the cumulative effect of parallel networks of
272similar agreements.
The new Franchising Regulation will give greater legal
certainty to enterprises, because they will know what provi-
sions they can or cannot insert in their franchise contracts,
without the need to notify the Commission. In case of doubt,
the opposition procedure will make it possible for undertak-
ings to have a rapid answer as to the validity of .their agree-
ments. The Regulation should, therefore, favor the develop-
ment of franchising agreements in the Community, which
would result in considerable economic benefits, in particular
for small- and medium-sized enterprises. Its adoption coin-
cides with the adoption of the block exemption regulation on
know-how agreements.273 Together with the other block ex-
emptions already adopted, they form a coherent body of legis-
lation aimed at giving more legal certainty.
The Community approach of adopting block exemption
regulations has sometimes been criticized as being too rigid
and artificial. It has been argued that it would be preferable to
apply, as in the United States, a rule-of-reason analysis to verti-
cal restrictions. It is true that the block exemption method is
somewhat Procrustean, but it has the merit of clarity. It should
not be overlooked that the aims of antitrust policy are not the
same in the United States as in Europe, where the goal of mar-
ket integration is an important aspect of competition policy.
Furthermore, the consequence of the particular structure of
Article 85 is that a rule-of-reason type analysis can only be
made under paragraph 3 of that Article after notification to the
Commission.274 It is interesting, in that respect, to note that
Professor Hawk, in his treatise on United States and Common
Market antitrust, argues that in U.S. law, vertical restrictions
should be given a rebuttable presumption of illegality in a way
similar to Article 85, where such agreements are presumed to
violate Article 85(1) and may be exempted under Article 85(3)
272. Franchising Regulation, supra note 22, art. 8(a), at 51, reprinted infra p. 310.
273. Know-How Regulation, supra note 72.
274. For a comparison of the analysis under Article 85(3) with a rule-of-reason
analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act, see 2 B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COM-
MON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 109-12 (2d ed. 1987).
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only upon a showing of increased efficiency.275 Block exemp-
tion regulations avoid the need for notification and individual
exemptions and also avoid the burdensome litigation involved
in the application of the rule of reason. For agreements fulfil-
ling the conditions set out in a block exemption regulation, it is
only where, because of particular circumstances, the positive
effects on competition are not present, that an individual ex-
amination must be made in order to withdraw the benefit of
the exemption.
275. See id. at 311.
